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Resümee 
 
 
2015.aastal saabus peamiselt Itaaliasse ja Kreekasse rohkem kui miljon põgenikku 
Süüriast, Liibüast, jt riikidest, kus oli puhkenud verine konflikt. Kuna sellisel hulgal 
põgenike vastuvõtmiseks ei olnud valmis Euroopa Liit ega tema liikmesriigid, sai EL 
2015.aastal terava kriitika osaliseks. Puhkenud kriisist lõikasid muuhulgas kasu 
populistlikud ja paremäärmuslikud erakonnad, kelle populaarsus rändekriisi ajal 
hüppeliselt tõusis. ELi süüdistati tegevusetuses ja peataolekus, mis võimaldas kriisil 
eskaleeruda ning kontrolli alt väljuda.  
 
Magistritöö käsitleb agentuuride vahelist koostööd ELi kriisireguleerimisalastes 
tegevustes 2015 rändekriisi ajal, analüüsides EL agentuuridest Frontexi ja Europoli 
tegevust. Kolmanda kriisiga seotud osapoolena analüüsib töö 
mittetulundusorganisatsioonide (MTÜde) tegevust. Töö eesmärk on uurida, mis takistas 
agentuuride vahelist koostööd rändekriisi ajal. Autor püstitas hüpoteesi, et erinev 
organisatsioonikultuur ja kriisi tajumine takistas EL agentuuride ja MTÜde tegevust. 
Hüpoteesi kinnitamiseks püstitas autor kaks uurimisküsimust:  
a) kuidas tajusid Frontex, Europol ja MTÜd rändekriisi olemust? 
b) kuidas mõjutas organisatsioonikultuur Frontexi, Europoli ja MTÜde tegevust 
rändekriisi ajal? 
 
Magistritöö annab ülevaate kriisi kui mõiste tähendusest ning kriisireguleerimise 
arengust, jõudes järeldusele, et globaliseeruva maailma tingimustes nõuab tõhus 
kriisireguleerimine aktiivset ja rahvusvahelist ning organisatsioonide vahelist koostööd. 
Autor annab ülevaate EL kriisireguleerimisalasest võimekusest ning tegevustest, samuti 
agentuuride vahelise koostöö põhimõtete rakendamisest tsiviil-sõjalise koostöö raames, 
jõudes järeldusele, et erinev organisatsioonikultuur muudab õiguskaitseorganisatsioonide 
nagu Frontex ja Europol ning mittetulundusühingute koostöö keeruliseks.  
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Töö uurib rändekriisiaegset koostööd läbi kolme aspekti: tegevused hotspotides ehk 
põgenikelaagrites, tegevused aluste jälgimisel merel ning tegevused piiripunktides. Autor 
jõuab järeldusele, et MTÜd tajusid kriisi humanitaarkriisina ning Frontex ja Europol 
julgeolekukriisina. Organisatsioonide erinev arusaam kriisist ning lisaks erinev 
organisatsioonikultuur põhjustasid olukorra, kus EL agentuurid ja MTÜd ei olnud 
võimelised tegema tõhusat koostööd, mis kinnitas töö hüpoteesi. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
Moving from one country or region to another is not a new phenomenon, people in search 
for better life and opportunities have done it for centuries. Europe has not been any 
different from other regions – people have moved in and out for centuries in search for 
better life.  The last mass migration within and from Europe occurred during WWII, when 
people from war-torn countries were looking to escape the horrors of fierce battles and 
war. Since then the Europeans had mostly witnessed atrocities only on TV and were 
enjoying arguably one of the best periods in recent history when the migration crisis of 
2015 struck. In the early 21st century the European Union found itself in a situation where 
the internal borders between member states were not controlled, people and goods moved 
across borders unchecked, the principle of free movement was being taken for granted. 
To compensate the lack of control on borders, some of EU MS were and are relying on 
technical solutions at their borders and information exchange between MS, others only 
relied on information exchange. 
 
As said, the privilege of free movement requires strict control of the union’s external 
borders, which the EU had been striving for years. National governments, however, were 
not prepared to handle hundreds of thousands of migrants and as Boin & Rhinard (2008) 
argue, national preparedness might even not be sufficient any longer as successful 
response to crisis requires not only intergovernmental and interagency coordination but 
also international co-operation in crisis management. Furthermore, one of the countries 
to be affected by the influx, Greece, was still in turmoil caused by the financial crisis and 
therefore in even more vulnerable situation. Through agencies like Frontex and Europol 
the EU had means and resources available to interfere in the crisis at transboundary level.  
 
The agreement between EU MS to let people and goods move across internal borders 
unchecked, known as the Schengen treaty, clearly states that internal borders may be 
crossed at any point without any checks on persons being carried out (Schengen, 2005). 
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This simple statement is at least a partial cause for one of the biggest crises in the history 
of the EU as migrants took advantage of this system and having reached Greece or Italy 
were able to move on to other EU countries. Arguably, life in the European Union is 
economically stable and secure. One might argue how much has the EU contributed to 
that aspect but the general standard of life in Africa or Asia cannot be compared to that 
of Europe. Some European countries such as Germany or Sweden have always stood out 
among migrants and these were the places the Africans and Asians were trying to reach 
as they started their journeys from their countries of origin (Frontex, 2016). As stated 
before, the fact that once you crossed the external border to Greece or Italy, you were in 
the EU and in the promised land, was widely known and used amongst the migrants. So, 
therefore it can be argued that in a way the Schengen system itself contributed to the 
crisis.  
  
If a person or a small group of persons move from one country to another, it does not 
affect the overall security, however after 2011 the number of migrants sharply increased 
and especially in 2015 more than one million people came to the EU by crossing the 
Mediterranean and Aegean Sea, putting Italy and Greece as the external border states of 
the EU under pressure. Later on, as migrants moved on, after having reached the border 
countries of the EU, Hungary, Austria, Slovenia and other EU members started to struggle 
with the influx. As the EU had created the Schengen system, the union was heavily 
criticized by member countries, scholars and think tanks for not being able to foresee such 
a scenario and secondly for not being able handle the situation.  
 
2015 migration crisis on the Mediterranean put the EU under pressure - thousands of 
people lost their lives trying to cross the sea to reach the shores of Europe. EU’s response 
to the crisis was heavily criticized not only by politicians but also by scholars and think 
tanks (New York Times, 2015). Several member states harshly criticized EU’s actions in 
handling the crisis, especially Hungary, Poland and other eastern MS, cracking the unity 
and solidarity the EU was so proud of (BBC, 2016).  
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According to Huysmans, the link between the abolition of internal border control and the 
strengthening of external border control rests on the assumptions such that control of the 
irregular movement of goods, capital, services and people happens at the border 
(Huysmans, 2006, p.70). Border control hence played a key role in the spill-over of the 
internal market into internal security, which became formally part of the EU policy at the 
same time with the completion of the EU internal market in 1992 (Horii, 2016). Border 
control, however, does not consist only of checks at the border, it includes other activities 
(risk analysis, information exchange, etc) and requires the efforts of multiple agencies. 
The EU as a supranational body consisting of multiple agencies, committees and other 
organization should have made the interagency approach pivotal for itself to succeed in 
its effort to manage the migration crisis of 2015 effectively.  
 
The European Union was not created to be a security actor, it was to be an economic 
union, so the security aspect and co-operation in home and justice affairs was at first 
merely a spillover, rather unwanted one, one might even claim. However, by the 
beginning of the second decade of 21st century the EU had created several instruments 
through which to handle crises and by 2015 had already some experience in handling 
them. The financial crisis in Greece is the first to come to mind. Outside the EU, missions 
within CSDP had been implemented for several years by 2015, although it must be noted 
that for EU agencies concerned in 2015 and after, similar crisis had not occurred before.   
 
The EU was not the only actor to react to the crisis as various NGOs also responded 
quickly and started providing humanitarian aid to migrants arriving in Europe. As EU 
agencies involved and the national authorities of Italy and Greece possessed limited 
capabilities, the addition of a humanitarian actor seemed welcome. When the hotspot 
approach was implemented, the NGOs set up their offices at hotspots to provide aid to 
migrants as efficiently and quickly as possible.  
 
All of this seemed to provide solid basics for mutual co-operation and the efficient 
implementation of interagency approach to solve the crisis, however this was not to be 
the case as the EU agencies and the NGOs began blaming each other through mass and 
social media for hindering each other’s work. As the blame game continued, it became 
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obvious that there were more significant reasons for such animosity than a single 
misunderstanding or mistake by one of the actors concerned. This required an in-depth 
look into the organizations involved and their organizational cultures and goals set for the 
crisis to understand whether the problems can be explained by organizations having 
different goals and perceptions for and of crisis. To understand whether the actors 
researched in this paper might have perceived the crisis differently and had therefore set 
goals that were obstructive for the other actor, the meaning of crisis and the management 
of transnational crisis must be looked into in-depth. Moreover, an understanding of crisis 
management tools and resources available to the EU is needed to exclude the possibility 
of failed interagency approach within the EU.  
 
 
1.1. The purpose of the research, hypothesis and the research questions 
 
The study of interagency approach is not something new, it has been dealt with by several 
scholars, albeit from different angle. Interagency approach has been also called 
“comprehensive approach” and within this paper, both are used as well. Robert Egnell 
has studied the approach in detail but from civilian-military co-operation perspective 
(Egnell, 2009). However, as the migration crisis is relatively recent, it has not been 
studied from the interagency approach perspective in detail as of yet. Given the unique 
position and composition of the EU, comprehensive approach seems inevitable but was 
this what happened in 2015? Egnell’s perspective of civilian-military co-operation might 
apply to given case as the NGOs are civilian organizations working to promote 
humanitarian causes and save lives, whereas Frontex and Europol can be both considered 
law enforcement agencies whose general task is to ensure security and safety of European 
citizens. The co-operation between law enforcement agencies and the NGOs have not yet 
been similar to the military, where Civil-Military Co-Operation (CIMIC) concept has 
been in use for quite some time. Perhaps it can also be used effectively in crisis 
management and the concept of interagency approach can be successfully implemented 
not only within the same institution but also with other partners.  
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Pielmus (2015) notes the strong, tradition reinforced organizational culture of law 
enforcement agencies which stresses the importance of regulated behaviour and 
adherence to strict norms. The members of law enforcement agencies are expected to 
uphold certain behavioural standards and must follow the orders or guidelines at all times. 
The NGOs on the other hand are known for their flexible organizational structures and 
might be established only for accomplishing certain tasks, making their lifespan short at 
times (Lewis, 2010). If one actor has a set of goals which do not change over time and 
follows them strictly, whereas the other actor might have goals that are changing over 
time and might have a flexible attitude towards the goals and how to achieve them, then 
the implementation of interagency approach cannot be effective.  
 
Possible differences in organizational cultures might explain the difficulties in co-
operating with each other that EU agencies and the NGOs had and still have in solving 
the migration crisis. All of this might have prevented the effective implementation of the 
interagency approach, so the hypothesis set for this paper is as follows: 
 
Different organizational cultures and understanding of crisis prevented the effective 
implementation of interagency approach between the NGOs and Frontex and 
Europol during the migration crisis.  
 
To research the hypothesis, the author put forward the following research questions: 
 
x How did the NGOs, Frontex and Europol perceive the migration crisis? 
 
x How did their respective organizational culture affect the actions of Frontex, 
Europol and the NGOs during the migration crisis? 
 
The hypothesis will be researched using exploratory case-study methodology. Baxter and 
Jack have noted that binding the case will ensure that your study remains reasonable in 
scope (Baxter & Jack, 2008). As the migration crisis consisted of several issues and 
aspects, a range too broad to cover in a single thesis, a choice was made. The author chose 
three aspects where the use of interagency approach in crisis management will be 
scrutinized - firstly the activities in hotspots created by EU agencies and local authorities 
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in Italy and Greece to process the arriving migrants, secondly the EU’s surveillance of 
vessels on the Mediterranean and the Aegean sea during the crisis and thirdly monitoring 
of border crossing points. All these aspects can be considered as part of crisis 
management instruments in 2015 and even today.  
 
As Frontex and Europol are both law enforcement agencies, they follow strict rules on 
processing personal and operational data, thereby limiting the possibility to use internal 
documents for research purposes. Thereby the research had to concentrate on public 
material, namely the agencies’ public documents and media articles. The research did not 
concentrate on any single NGO as there were and are several NGOs operating in Italy 
and Greece, thereby the actions of different NGOs were generalized for the purposes of 
this paper. Furthermore, the actions of two EU agencies, Frontex and Europol within the 
aspects mentioned above were analysed in depth and thirdly, the actions of NGOs were 
analysed to understand whether interagency approach in crisis management can be 
effectively used with third parties. 
 
The thesis shows that the actors researched in this paper were not able to implement 
efficient interagency approach as the perceptions of the crisis varied. The NGOs 
perceived the crisis as mainly humanitarian issue, Frontex and Europol on the other hand 
perceived it as a border security and organized crime issue. As EU agencies acted 
according to their set of rules and tasks and dealt with what they thought was the problem 
at hand, i.e. stopping irregular migrants and when needed, restricting their arrival in 
Europe, the NGOs wanted to ensure the arrival of migrants as their stay in Libya or other 
similar countries was considered life-threatening. Furthermore, whereas units of EU 
agencies acted everywhere as a part of a bigger strategy, the NGOs were different as some 
of them were established only for certain period of time and acted locally. Conflicting 
goals resulted in conflicting actions (e.g. the NGOs tried to facilitate the arrival of 
migrants in Europe which was perceived by Frontex and Europol as illegal action, thereby 
causing tensions between EU agencies and the NGOs).  
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2. Crisis and its management 
 
2.1. The meaning and perception of crisis 
 
A big car crash along major route blocking traffic or a big house or blocks of houses on 
fire is a crisis, at least for the people involved in the event. Such an event, however, which 
is often somewhat “a routine emergency”, will most likely be forever within the 
competency of national, if not local authority. An emergency refers to a complex and 
urgent but also a routine problem (Boin & Rhinard, 2008). Crisis, albeit perhaps urgent 
and complex as well, is not routine. The Oxford Living Dictionary of English defines 
“crisis” as “a time of intense difficulty or danger” (The Oxford Living Dictionary of 
English, 2017), which in a sense captures the whole concept of crisis – it usually occurs 
on different levels and involves several fields of life. If one had visited Greek islands at 
the time of migration crisis in 2015, locals would have described their feelings and 
emotions in similar words. Crisis is a time of intense difficulty indeed, even if one’s life 
is not in direct danger. Interestingly, “crisis” is always defined differently by 
organizations or institutions and one single definition has not been agreed upon, so it 
comes down to perceiving an event as a crisis in order it to be called as such.  
 
The perception of crisis, however, must be discussed as well. Although in most cases 
people and organizations perceive the crisis similarly and threats are easy to distinguish, 
one has to keep in mind that even in times of crisis, the organizations have their agendas 
and goals to strive for and therefore a crisis might provide the best opportunity for 
achieving an objective (Hart & Sundelius, 2013). Hitherto, co-operation in crisis cannot 
be taken for granted and may be complex as different agendas collide. This might mean 
severe difficulties in crisis response as organizations cannot agree on mutual goals. 
Inability to agree on the latter might result from different organizational cultures and 
perceptions.  
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As said, a crisis affects more people and organizations than at first meets the eye – think 
of the hurricanes around the world or the Icelandic Volcanic Ash crisis – the latter did not 
involve emergency services but rather transport systems, airlines, etc. Ansell, Boin and 
Keller (2010) have noted that the characteristics of crises are strikingly similar, no matter 
whether talk is about epidemics, energy blackouts, financial crises, ice storms, oil spills 
or cyber terrorism –they affect multiple jurisdictions, undermine the functioning of 
various policy sectors and critical infrastructures, escalate rapidly and morph along the 
way. Moreover, whereas “routine emergencies” that occur regularly, provide responders 
with experience of how to react, in a crisis past experience provides policymakers with 
little guidance (Ansell, Boin & Keller, 2010). Furthermore, it is vital to understand what 
kind of crises we have in the 21st century – last years have seen dramatic increase of 
terrorist attacks, disasters, etc but the list is not all-inclusive. 
 
Interestingly, the EU has not defined “crisis” in a universal way and the term has remained 
open for any EU related actor, including EU agencies, to define as it sees suitable (Batora 
et al, 2016). Therefore “crisis” can be internal (e.g. a financial crisis), a perceived or other 
tangible threat to justice and home affairs (e.g. uncontrolled migration influxes) or 
external crisis (e.g. international conflict) (Boin, Ekengren & Rhinard, 2013). When the 
EU began its crisis management activities by preparing and dispatching peace missions, 
“crisis” was thought of as an international conflict taking place outside the EU.  
 
Modern crises are not bound by geographical borders or any other man-made limits, 
which requires the involvement of different actors in crisis management. These actors are 
less acquainted with each other, have different agendas and interests and are more 
dispersed (Ansell, Boin & Keller, 2010). EU has the most extensive cross-border 
connection in the world and the result today is an overall system in which many of the 
functions that sustain basic societal life (for example, energy grids, transport networks, 
food distribution, and financial flow structures) cross European political borders. It 
undermines the effectiveness of the nation-state’s traditional organizational, policy, and 
legal tools. As a result of a rapidly evolving character and unforeseen interactions, it is 
virtually impossible to recognize and understand a transboundary crisis before its 
consequences take effect (Boin & Rhinard, 2008).  
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2.2. Crisis Management 
 
2.2.1. Phases of crisis 
 
 
The strategic use of fear has become part and parcel of our world (Klein, 2007), as has 
the institutional expansion of state and international apparatuses devoted to “managing” 
known and potential security risks (Hart & Sundelius, 2013). Fear, however, must be 
controlled and risks managed by states and institutions as crisis management is seen as 
one of the core obligations of a state, yet states find themselves in a situation where the 
concept of crisis management constantly changes. Hart and Sundelius (2013) argue that 
the threats and challenges in Europe of the twenty-first century are less about the integrity 
of territory than about safeguarding the critical functions of society, protecting people, 
and upholding fundamental values and structures of democratic governance.  
 
Boin, Ansell & Keller (2010) define crisis management as the coordinated and effective 
response to crisis situations, whose first target is to counter the threat and to minimize the 
consequences. Crisis management is also defined as the coordination of actions to control 
a critical situation during the pre – event awareness, prevention, preparation, response 
and recovery with the post event restoration (Shaw & Harrald, 2004). Hart and Sundelius 
(2013) have divided crisis management into pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis phase (see 
Figure 1), which have been studied from technical-managerial and strategic-political 
aspect, although there has not been much overlapping in the studies until lately.   
 
The strategic-political aspect sets out guidelines on not only which risks should be dealt 
with but also what should be defined a potential threat or risk, including political level 
(Hart & Sundelius, 2013). The perception of a threat might be similar amongst European 
nations, however, the perception of a threat in North Korea or Russia is altogether 
different. Wider stakeholder-based perspective of crisis management is needed to be 
included so that one can explain why some emergencies upgrade into political 
controversies, which in turn escalate into national traumas and the cascading 
consequences of crises extend beyond what is the main operational focus in the parallel 
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field of consequence management (Hart & Sundelius, 2013). Certain crises turn into 
traumas and never come to closure and their after-shocks linger across generations, so it 
is important to know why this happens and what factors can prevent such a degenerate 
process occurring (Hart & Sundelius, 2013).  
 
Pre-crisis phase involves preventive actions as planning and preparedness, at technical 
level it mostly includes early warning systems and educating specialists (mostly law 
enforcement officers and emergency services officials) to manage the crises (Hart & 
Sundelius, 2013). At political level the general question of what is perceived as a risk is 
decided upon, furthermore another vital issue is looked into: what is the level of risk the 
society or country is willing to accept? Should the city of Naples in Italy be evacuated 
right now in fear of the eruption or should we accept the fact that Mt Vesuvius will erupt 
one day and there will inevitably be some casualties but the Italian state and its emergency 
and social services are ready to help and evacuate at least some people from Naples? This 
is just one of the examples states, regions, cities, etc need to constantly think of. Integrated 
approaches to studying “risk, crisis and emergency management” have become the norm 
and the focus among both security and safety specialists has shifted towards generic 
vulnerabilities in modern societies, regardless of the source of the threat (e.g. critical 
infra-structures) (Hart & Sundelius, 2013).  
 
Crisis phase is often thought to be the most important phase of crisis management and 
according to Hart & Sundelius (2013) it is hard to argue that all the planning and 
preparedness will be of no use if actions undertaken in crisis phase are random and not 
organized. Furthermore, Hart & Sundelius (2013) note that the problem here is that in 
modern high-tech world we are prepared for natural disasters and other similar events and 
crises in this field are thought of as preparedness failures. Hart & Sundelius (2013) talk 
about the “vulnerability paradox”, noting that the more invulnerable a community has 
been in the past, the more severe the social and political impact of any single disruption 
it does experience. They consider it to be a cultural phenomenon: the population is 
unprepared for hardship, and more likely to be traumatized and uninformed about ways 
to survive and recover (Hart & Sundelius, 2013). Politically, in an EU used to peace, 
wealth and safety, a major disruption to any of these is likely to generate intense pressure 
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to blame individuals and organizations for what happened and in the contemporary media 
climate, such blame is bound to focus on the leaders of government (Hart & Sundelius, 
2013). Therefore, as mentioned before, the consequences of torrential rain cannot be 
considered a crisis, whereas the influx of thousands of people to a country which has only 
scarce resources and means to handle the situation can and will be considered one and the 
impact will be significant on all levels of society. 
 
Post-crisis phase has been long known for the question of accountability. One might even 
argue that looking for somebody to blame is far more important than looking at the causes 
and possible preventive actions. The political and legal dynamics of accountability 
processes play a significant role in determining which crisis actors emerge unscathed and 
which end up with damaged reputations and careers (Boin et al, 2008). The burden of 
proof in post-crisis inquiries and accountability debates lies with the responsible 
policymakers and such accountability debates are often little more than “blame games” 
focused on identifying and punishing culprits rather than deliberating and reflecting 
seriously on crisis causes and consequences (Boin et al, 2008). A key challenge for 
leaders is coping with the politics of crisis account-ability, without the use of unseemly 
and potentially self-defeating tactics of blame avoidance or “finger pointing” that only 
serve to prolong the crisis and heighten political tensions (Hart & Sundelius, 2013). As 
the accountability question looms large on the horizon and the level of involvement in 
given crisis rises up to politicians, it is difficult to expect to see thorough and neutral 
analyses on crisis management.  
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 Technical–managerial: 
the study of risk and 
crisis “management” 
Strategic–political: the 
study of risk and crisis 
“politics”  
Pre-crisis phase Mitigation, preparedness, 
early warning as 
professional activity 
clusters and determinants 
of systemic resilience  
Strategic interests and 
controversies about risk 
perception, risk 
acceptability and risk 
regulation  
Crisis phase Dynamics of individual, 
group and network 
information processing 
decision-making, 
coordination, 
communication under 
conditions of threat, 
uncertainty and urgency  
Role of political, economic 
and bureaucratic self-
interests and power 
relations in shaping crisis 
response operations  
Post-crisis phase Organization and delivery 
of long-term support and 
recovery programmes, 
lesson-drawing  
Contested legitimacy of 
status quo through media 
and official investigations 
and debates, resulting in 
opportunities for advocates 
of change, reform and 
renewal  
 
Figure 1 Three phases of crisis and areas of research within them (Hart & Sundelius, 
2013) 
 
A somewhat more straightforward way to look at crisis management is to distinguish 
preparedness and response phase of a crisis and talk of traditional and novelty crisis 
management (Baubion, 2013) as mentioned before, a crisis or rather an understanding of 
what kind situation is perceived as one, changes constantly. “The military is always 
preparing for the last war” is a famous saying and at times it seems to apply for crisis 
management as well. Traditional crisis management relied heavily on previous crises but 
as the world changes at ever quicker pace, one must look at the crisis of the 21st century 
and to manage it needs to understand what it is. If something is constant in crisis 
management, then it must be the fact that every new crisis will be different from previous 
ones.  
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Traditional crisis management Dealing with novelty 
PREPAREDNESS PHASE 
x Risk assessment based on 
historical events;   
x Scenario based 
emergency planning;   
x Early Warning systems 
based on monitoring 
forecasting, warning 
messages, communication 
and link with emergency 
response.   
 
x  Risk assessment includes horizon 
scanning, risk radars and forward 
looking, analysis to detect 
emerging threats. Frequent 
updates and different timescales, 
international analysis sharing, 
multidisciplinary approaches are 
key attributes;   
x  Capability-based planning and 
network building;   
x  Strategic crisis management 
training to learn agility and 
adaptability and create networks 
and partnerships;   
x  Strategic engagement from 
centres of government.   
RESPONSE PHASE 
x  Command and control system;   
x  Standard Operating Procedures;   
x  Strict lines of responsibilities;   
x  Sectoral approaches;   
x  Principle of subsidiarity;   
x  Feedback to improve future  
management.   
 
x  Crisis identification/ monitoring, 
role of expertise;   
x  Flexible and multi-purpose crisis 
management teams and facilities; 
  
x  Common concepts across 
agencies to inform leadership 
with high adaptive capacities;   
x  Similar tools and protocols that 
could be utilised for multi-crisis; 
  
x  International cooperation;   
x  Management of large-response 
networks;   
x  Ending crisis and restoring trust;   
x  Feedback.   
 
Figure 2 Different approaches in crisis management (Baubion, 2013) 
 
Modern crises have shown the incapability of traditional crisis management which relies 
heavily on standard operating procedures and strict lines of responsibility (Boin et al, 
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2008). After terrorist attack in Paris in November 2015, the suspect fled to Brussels, 
Belgium, where his whereabouts were quickly established by local police. The problem 
was, however, the Belgian law which at the time strictly forbade house searches at night, 
therefore delaying the detention operation by several hours. When police eventually 
searched the apartment of the suspect, he had already escaped (New York Times, 2016). 
Whilst the problem in this case was legal, the example clearly illustrates the need for more 
flexible approach in all areas. One can also discuss the involvement of political level in 
crisis management in this example, albeit somewhat philosophically – what if the Belgian 
government had ordered the police to raid the house at night? When looking at the 
flexibility in crisis management, inevitably the aspect of different cultures must be 
considered as well, especially when talking about the EU.  
 
Not only are the legal systems and principles different within the EU, also the overall 
system and public bureaucracy must be thought of – for instance, Estonian and 
Scandinavian law enforcement officers have always struggled to co-operate with 
Southern European colleagues, as not only are their cultural perceptions and traditions 
different but latter countries also have several law enforcement agencies overlapping in 
their tasks. Thereby finding the right person within the right agency is a daunting and at 
times almost unsurmountable task. 
 
2.3. Transboundary and Transnational Crisis Management 
 
We must understand how crises have evolved and how a 21st century crisis differs from 
previous ones in order to discuss transnational and transboundary crisis management. In 
the future, we expect to see more and more transnational crises (Boin & Rhinard, 2008).  
To discuss crises that will cross borders, an understanding of what is transnational or 
transboundary crisis, is required. Three distinct features of transnational or transboundary 
crises can be distinguished: 
 
x A crisis happens on an unexpectedly large scale (Baubion, 2013), e.g. terrorist 
attacks 
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x the fact that similar crises have not happened before – at least in human or crisis 
managers’ memories – or they have a very unusual combination (Leonard, 2012), 
e.g. Icelandic Volcanic Ash crisis 
x their cross - border nature (Boin, Ansell, & Keller, 2010), e.g. the migration crisis 
of 2015 
 
Every noteworthy modern crisis will get media attention and at times will be blown out 
of its proportions. Social media plays an integral role in this phenomenon as information 
moves quickly and is modified, either on purpose or by accident. The term “media crisis” 
has been used more and more often as time goes on. As mentioned, last mass migration 
in Europe occurred during WWII and Europeans have enjoyed relatively peaceful life 
ever since. It is somewhat inevitable that the migration crisis of 2015 took Europe by 
surprise as no one had given much thought to that. Not only were the member states ill-
prepared, the Dublin system for asylum seekers was clearly not suitable for such an influx 
of migrants, etc, etc. The cross-border nature of a crisis will affect other states either 
directly (e.g. suspected terrorist flees from France to Belgium) or indirectly (e.g. the 
Icelandic Ash crisis which threw transport systems around the world into turmoil).  The 
cross - border nature of any crisis can be described in terms of three dimensions; the 
higher a crisis scores on each dimension, the more transboundary it is (Boin, Ansell, 
Keller, 2010).  
 
The first dimension refers to political boundaries as many crises fall within a 
geographically bounded political jurisdiction, such as a town (a factory explosion) or a 
country (a political crisis) (Boin, Ansell & Keller, 2010). Crises can cross territorial 
boundaries and threaten multiple cities, regions, countries or even continents, a crisis can 
cross political boundaries vertically and horizontally (Boin, Ansell & Keller, 2010). 
When lower levels of government (cities, counties, provinces, states) are overwhelmed 
by a crisis, for example, they may require help from higher levels of government 
(national, regional, international), which is the vertical dimension of transboundary 
activity (Boin, Ansell & Keller, 2010). A crisis can also spread horizontally across the 
boundaries between two political jurisdictions operating at the same level of government 
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– like two cities or two nations. We expect transboundary crisis management to be more 
difficult when both vertical and horizontal coordination is required (Chisholm, 1989).  
 
The second dimension is functional (Boin, Ansell & Keller, 2010). A crisis can fall neatly 
within a policy, however, many crises spill over - they jump functional boundaries, 
threatening multiple life-sustaining systems, functions or infrastructures. For instance, 
crises may cross from a financial system into an industrial system, from the private to the 
public sphere, from one sector of industry to another - crises that cross functional 
boundaries are difficult to manage because they often involve systems with different 
logics and operating imperatives (Boin, Ansell & Keller, 2010).  
 
The third dimension is time (Boin, Ansell & Keller, 2010). Some crises are clearly 
demarcated in time: they have a defined beginning and ending. Many crises, however, 
exceed such time boundaries (Birkland, 2009). This may be because they are not single 
events, but rather a range of related situations, or it may be that a crisis has multiple effects 
that appear on different time scales. Crises that cross temporal boundaries are difficult to 
manage because they may require first responders to sustain the response for extended 
periods or because they create uncertainty about when to stand down from a response 
(Boin, Ansell & Keller, 2010). They can also contribute to response fragmentation 
because different functional capabilities have to be mobilized at different times. In 
general, a crisis that scores high on all three dimensions is our typical transboundary crisis 
(Boin, Ansell & Keller, 2010).  
 
These aspects mean that a successful response to a transnational crisis would be beneficial 
in international cooperation between the EU, its member states and other actors. 
According to Baubion (2013), in addition to exchanging good practices and/or defining 
common standards for interagency crisis management, international and regional co-
operation could help national crisis management in different ways. However, it is 
necessary to keep in mind that transnational crises create a need for extreme adaptation 
and unprecedented cooperation under conditions in which these are most difficult to 
achieve – when the capacity and authority for response is divided across multiple 
organizations and jurisdictions or even between two or more countries and when the crisis 
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itself creates difficult patterns of interdependence among the actors involved (Boin, 
Ansell & Keller, 2010).  
 
If the question of jurisdiction is not clear and an adequate and quick response to crisis is 
expected, international organizations might be the answer to look to. If a terrorist is on 
the run somewhere in the Netherlands, Belgium or France, should we not ask for EU 
agencies to locate and neutralize him or is this the question everybody is afraid to ask as 
it would undermine the nation-state’s sovereignty? According to Boin, Ansell & Keller 
(2010) patterns of interdependence will be created by any such crisis, thereby a 
transnational body managing a transnational crisis does not automatically constitute a 
threat to nation-state’s sovereignty.  
 
 
2.4. EU as Crisis Manager 
 
The EU has dealt with crises for quite some time and its capacities to do it effectively 
have evolved significantly over time. The union’s role as crisis manager started with 
peace missions but it has evolved significantly ever since. The European Union is in a 
unique role as there is very little agreement on how crisis and security management efforts 
can be efficiently and legitimately organized at European level, therefore all efforts to 
enhance the EU’s role will inevitably encounter this problem (Boin, Ekengren, Rhinard 
2013).  
 
EU is not a single polity, but an entity consisting of 28 member states which all have their 
own country-specific interests, traditions and rules. As Neal notes, “despite the 
integration Project, “Europe” is not a single polity and can not be treated as one” (Neal, 
2009). Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) (including border security) have long been 
considered as one of the core areas where countries can decide on how to regulate and act 
upon their best interests. The world, however, has changed and keeps changing so EU 
must face the reality – in order to preserve the four freedoms it must adapt to new situation 
and work together regardless of the differences. For instance the creation of European 
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Border and Coast Guard Agency Frontex was a kind of a reaction to the processes and 
events evolving and happening around and in EU, 9/11 is considered to be one of the 
main factors behind the establishing decision (Neal, 2009).  
 
As mentioned above, modern crises tend to be more and more transnational by their 
nature, making them difficult for any single nation-state to manage. As soon as crisis 
extends itself directly or indirectly to another country, its management becomes more 
complex, as new actors are to be considered. This puts EU in a seemingly perfect position 
to lead the effort to manage transnational crises in EU MS. The reality, however, is a bit 
more complex. Transnational or transboundary crisis undermines the effectiveness of the 
nation-state’s traditional organizational, policy, and legal tools and it is much harder to 
address because, for one thing, it is unclear who “owns” a transboundary crisis and who 
should act on it. As it morphs from one domain to another, moving across geographical 
boundaries, responsibilities quickly blur (Boin & Rhinard, 2008). Perhaps more 
importantly, we lack the fundamental knowledge that would allow crisis managers to de-
escalate chain reactions by swiftly “de-coupling” intertwined complex systems (Perrow, 
1999).  
 
This has become a conundrum for EU – although the union might not be welcome to step 
in and act upon when member states are not able manage the crisis on their own, as the 
latter will see it as the breach of their sovereignty, on the other hand EU is expected to 
react and manage the transnational crisis effectively but in a way that does not directly 
affect the sovereignty of a member state. Therefore, the management of any crisis on any 
level is always going to be difficult for EU. As the EU faces a range of crisis situations 
not only at its borders but also in its extended neighbourhood, its ability to understand, 
perceive and react to crises is becoming ever more relevant (Batora et al, 2016). 
Furthermore, each of these crises represents different kinds of threats and challenges and 
given there is no uniform EU approach to crisis response and management, adequate 
perception of and reaction to crisis is paramount (Batora et al, 2016).  
 
Considering ever-changing security environment, EU crisis response is constantly being 
revised and improved and it is vital to take into account the efforts the EU has made and 
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is making by launching initiatives and processes aimed at keeping EU policies up to date 
with shifting security contexts (Batora et al, 2016). Since adopting Lisbon Treaty in 2009 
the EU has been working on improving internal co-oordination and streamlining its 
approach and these efforts have been stressed by recent war in Ukraine, ISIS in North 
Africa and Asia (Batora et al, 2016). The reaction to ongoing crises are in fact reflected 
in EU Global Strategy, which refers to an integrated approach to conflicts (EU Global 
Strategy, 2016).  
 
With the aggravation of climate change the number of crises is expected to increase even 
more, as natural and human-caused disasters have increased in frequency and scale during 
recent years (Georgiev, Egenhofer and Behrens, 2011). Batora et al (2016) underline the 
effects of pollution and contamination issues that will pose long-term threats to public 
health and the environment within the EU. Furthermore, serious and complex security 
threats such as terrorism will be too much to handle for any single EU member-state 
(Batora et al, 2016). This puts the EU under pressure to develop its crisis management to 
be efficient and coherent, although this would require solidarity in immediate response 
and responsibility in prevention and preparedness (Batora et al, 2016). As mentioned 
above, the EU does not define “crisis”, it distinguishes “internal” crisis (e.g. financial 
crisis), perceived threat from home and justice affairs (e.g. the uncontrolled influx of 
migrants) or “external” crisis (e.g. international conflict) (Boin, Ekengren, Rhinard, 
2013).  
 
Boin, Ekengren and Rhinard further elaborate that for the EU specifically there are three 
types of crisis: national or Type I crisis, external or Type II crisis and transboundary or 
Type III crisis (Boin, Ekengren & Rhinard, 2013). Type I crises occur when available 
resources are no longer sufficient to meet the needs of the victimized population, for 
instance in natural disasters (Boin, Ekengren & Rhinard, 2013). At the same time, within 
the EU this is an unlikely situation as EU member states generally have sufficient 
resources (Boin, Ekengren & Rhinard, 2013). Boin indicates that crisis response work for 
EU mostly concerns Type II crises (Boin, 2008). Whereas national crises are the easiest 
for EU to operate within (organizing and sending humanitarian aid, experts, etc), external 
crises will include sending humanitarian aid and possibly experts within special crisis 
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management missions (Boin, 2008). Response to transboundary crisis is the field where 
the EU will face the most difficult obstacles as it requires co-operation of several actors 
with different agenda (Boin, 2008).  
 
 
2.4.1. Crisis Management Tools of the EU 
 
Missions 
 
In essence, the EU has been involved in crisis management since the foundation of the 
union, as foreign aid was considered to be a tool for foreign policy. 1992 Maastricht 
Treaty was an important benchmark as it gave the EU an explicitly political and 
diplomatic role and the union has been increasingly involved in peacebuilding ever since 
(Blockmans, Wouters and Ruys 2010; Richmond, Bjørkdahl and Kappler 2011). The 
adoption of the EU Security Strategy in 2003 started the operational activities of the EU 
and by 2016 it had undertaken a total of 35 Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) 
operations of various kinds – usually either civilian or civil–military operations with the 
Commission promoting other tools to support these missions (Batora, et al 2016).  
 
Under the auspices of then ESDP the EU distinguished crisis management operations and 
crisis management missions, the former usually had a military component, while crisis 
management missions were usually of a civilian nature, therefore these two types of 
ESDP actions were often combined, especially in the field of civilian-military crisis 
management in which the EU specializes (Kuhn, 2009). One must consider, however, 
that the civilian peace missions have been tools for “external crisis” management and part 
of foreign policy of the union. When talking about internal crises (e.g. financial crisis in 
Greece) or events in the sphere of home and justice affairs (e.g. terrorist attacks in France 
and the following manhunt in other countries), the EU has not been able to rely on similar 
tools as the situation is remarkably different and involves interaction and co-operation 
with member states.  
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CSDP tools 
 
Structures and organizations dealing with crisis management within CSDP 
The EU has extensive range of structures and organizations in its use within CSDP. 
Several tools are permanent structures providing the EU the capabilities to monitor the 
international situation and react as quickly and adequately as possible. EEAS manages 
the Crisis Response System which covers crises outside the EU possibly affecting EU 
security or interests in third countries, CRS ranges from prevention and preparedness to 
response and recovery aiming to achieve a comprehensive EU crisis response and 
management capability (EEAS, 2017). An interesting tool of note is the EU Situation 
Room which, being a crisis centre, provides worldwide monitoring and current situation 
awareness 24 hours a day, 7 days a week and being the first point of contact for all 
information in crisis situations (EEAS, 2017). This provides the EU a tool which is 
constantly informed on and capable of initiating responses on everything even remotely 
affecting the union’s interests around the world.  
 
EEAS also includes CMPD (the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate), 
responsible for civilian-military planning for EU peacekeeping and humanitarian 
missions and operations (EEAS, 2017). In 2000, the Council of the European Union 
founded CIVCOM (The Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management), an 
advisory body dealing with the civilian aspects of crisis management. A parallel military 
structure within the EU is EUMC (the European Union Military Committee). Both 
EUMC and CIVCOM receive directions and report to PSC. PSC (Political and Security 
Committee) is a permanent strategic level body within the Commission consisting of 
ambassadors of member states providing a forum for discussing CSDP matters and being 
an international situation watchdog for the EU.  
 
Agencies involved in crisis management 
Out of more than 40 EU agencies around Europe, perhaps four can be considered to deal 
with the direct aspects of crisis management, especially in the context of the migration 
crisis. CEPOL (the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training) provides 
courses on crisis management. Frontex is tasked with risk analysis and organizing joint 
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operations based on their risk assessment. Europol (European Union Agency for Law 
Enforcement Cooperation) is tasked with preventing and combatting all kinds of serious 
international organized crime and terrorism (Europol, 2017). EASO (European Asylum 
Support Office) coordinates the co-operation of EU MS on asylum.  To facilitate more 
efficient co-operation between member states and Frontex, European Border Surveillance 
System (EUROSUR) was established in 2013. The main aim of EUROSUR is to increase 
the situation awareness capability and operational information exchange in combatting 
cross-border crime.  
 
2.5. Interagency approach in crisis management 
 
Facing recurrent complex crises requiring an improved coordination of civilian and 
military, international and local actors, the comprehensive approach concept has appeared 
both within international organisations (Nato, EU etc) and within governments (the US, 
France, the UK etc) (Wendling, 2010). The issue concerns restoring security, governance 
and development through an inter-agency, inter-ministerial or even an inter-
organisational approach (Wendling, 2010). Partners need to understand each other 
(literally and figuratively), as well as each other's working methods, aims, goals, and 
motivations (Yakhlef et al, 2017). 
 
Thomas, Bergethon & Reimer (2010) claim that the key to successful response to crisis 
management is the creation of a cross-discipline and interagency integrated response. 
National governments might fall short when it comes to responding adequately to crisis 
affecting several countries. According to Boin & Rhinard (2008), public bureaucracies 
will inevitably fall short of efficient crisis management. Is the integrated approach 
involving supranational or intergovernmental bodies viable solution in crisis management 
and does this change our perspective of EU’s handling of the migration crisis?  
Nevertheless, crisis management in the European Union has evolved a lot during the past 
decades (Beger, 2010). EU started by organizing peace missions in Europe and elsewhere, 
however it has also contributed to co-operation in the area of crisis management by 
accepting Convention 10900/05 and Council Decision 2008/615/JHA which deal with 
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cross-border co-operation against terrorism, cross-border crime and illegal migration. 
Furthermore, the previous chapter of this paper discussed the structures and institutions 
dealing with crisis management EU has developed over the past decade or so. This, 
however, does not mean self-evident success of interagency co-operation.  
 
Efficient crisis management depends on co-operation (Boin & Rhinard, 2008). All the 
main actors during the migration crisis established working structures on the ground quite 
rapidly and were quickly operational. Whereas the response to crisis was rapid, it did not 
necessarily mean full and efficient co-operation. Every actor had its own interests and 
was doing its utmost to follow and achieve these. During recent a new concept of 
“Comprehensive approach” has emerged within the activities of the EU and NATO 
(Spily, Nečas, Žak, 2011). Both organizations have come to understand the importance 
of co-operation of different actors in crisis management. When NATO’s means are 
understandably military, the EU disposes of a broad range of both civilian security sector 
reform, police, justice, civil administration, civil protection, monitoring, etc) and military 
instruments of crisis management, giving the union a big advantage in dealing with crises 
(Spily, Nečas, Žak, 2011).  
 
“Whole-of-government” and “whole-of-society” approaches have been often discussed 
in the context of civilian-military co-operation. Gheciu (2011) underlines the reluctance 
of the NGOs of co-operating with NATO as the latter is seen as a Western military 
organization unsuitable for civilian peacebuilding operations. Moreover, such process of 
competition and contestation between the NGOs and military might undermine the 
prospects of sustainable peacebuilding (Gheciu, 2011). As military and law enforcement 
organizations have similar organizational cultures adherent to strict norms and rules, 
problems between the NGOs and military can also occur between the NGOs and law 
enforcement agencies as well.  
 
Conclusions from theoretical framework 
 
The meaning and perception of crisis has changed over time and as the world around us 
keeps changing and evolving, the same applies to crises – globalization means more and 
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more crises will be transnational and transboundary and impossible to manage without 
implementing the interagency approach and effective co-operation. Different actors, 
however, find it difficult to co-operate with other actors as their goals do not match or 
even overlap and furthermore, the perception of crisis varies. Thirdly, the organizational 
culture of different actors might be altogether different as the discussed NATO-NGO 
partnership proved. All of this makes interagency co-operation very difficult to 
implement in practice.  
 
  
3. Migration crisis of 2015 
 
 
The Arab Spring in 2011 resulted in internal conflicts in several countries in Middle East 
and Africa and in civil war in Syria and Libya. As a result, people from these countries 
started to flee to other countries, mostly to Europe, to escape the horrors of war. Members 
of the EU, Greece and Italy, which became frontline states, could not handle the influx of 
migrants on their own and asked the EU for help. The EU understood the severity of the 
situation and committed itself to finding sustainable solution, which did not only involve 
using EU agencies and their means but also included initiatives on common asylum 
policy, migration policy, etc.  
 
Political aspects are not covered in this paper, the author concentrates mainly on the 
application of comprehensive interagency approach between Frontex, Europol and the 
NGOs in three different fields – in hotspots, in the surveillance of vessels in the 
Mediterranean and Aegean and in border crossing points. Moreover, as the crisis included 
the actions of the EU as an organization and almost, if not all member states individually, 
it will be considered a transboundary crisis as it did not stay within the authority of one 
state. Several actors were and are involved in solving the situation which is still ongoing 
as of now, albeit in smaller proportion. 
 
3.1. The choice of actors researched 
 
The purpose of this research was to find how different organizational cultures and 
understanding of crisis prevented the effective implementation of interagency approach 
between the NGOs and Frontex and Europol during the migration crisis.  
 
To research the use of interagency approach in migration crisis posed a serious question 
upon the author, namely who and how to look at as there are several possibilities. First 
the structures or organizations whose activities were to be researched had to be chosen. 
The author decided to research only the organizations who were active on both strategic-
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political and operational level as it gave broader possibilities to look at the crisis. Hence 
the EU institutions were excluded from the research. The author admits that the question 
whether EU agencies can be considered as strategic-political actors might be debatable 
but for the purposes of this research they are considered as such.  
 
As there are numerous NGOs, it cannot be said that all of them are actors on strategic-
political level. However, the majority of them are actively trying to influence the political 
decisions of other actors, so the NGOs can be considered as actors on both strategic-
political and operational level. Another problem concerning the NGOS is the different 
nature of these organizations. NGOs like Oxfam or Medecine Sans Frontieres employ 
hundreds of people, have long-term agendas which enable them to act in several countries 
and disaster areas, whereas small NGOs might only be project-based and created for 
short-term projects. Furthermore, the difference is also visible in financing as big NGOs 
have stable budgets which enable them to plan long-term, whereas small NGOs are able 
to operate short-term and use mostly non-paid volunteers.   
 
The activities of the EU agencies and structures involved in the crisis were quite public 
and their actions therefore somewhat easier to track and follow. As Frontex and Europol 
were both involved in the crisis from the beginning, their selection seemed reasonable, if 
not inevitable. However, to research whether the comprehensive approach was used and 
worked with third parties as well, another organization or actor was needed. Having been 
involved in the activities both in Greece and Italy personally, the author was familiar how 
the situation was dealt with and who were the main actors involved - in addition to the 
EU agencies the national authorities and the NGOs. EASO and other EU agencies were 
excluded from the research as comparing only EU agencies did not seem reasonable as 
similarities in their activities and goals in general were to be expected.  
 
Secondly, the national authorities of hosting member states were considered. Another 
issue emerged here as Italy and Greece as the main hosting countries during the migration 
crisis both have rather complicated bureaucracies. For instance, Italy has five different 
law enforcement agencies, who were and are involved in solving the migration crisis. 
Although these agencies may have a similar general goal, their detailed goals may be 
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overlapping, if not confronting, each other at times, making the research very 
complicated. For this reason the national authorities were excluded from this research. 
Moreover, as the research was to be conducted using public documents, it would have 
been difficult for the author to obtain understandable material as official documents in 
Greece and Italy are rarely translated to English. 
 
The NGOs have played a pivotal role in the migration crisis and have been involved in 
the crisis for several years now. The author was aware of the problems concerning the 
NGOs in current research, as also mentioned before. Firstly, various NGOs operate in 
Italy and Greece. One organization may be active in Greece or only on a couple of Greek 
islands, whereas some are active in both Italy and Greece, therefore raising the issue 
whether all or at least the majority of NGOs had similar goals. The research was not to 
be conducted on possible different goals of various NGOs, rather the goals of NGOs were 
assumed to be largely similar. Furthermore, the activities of various NGOs were similar 
in their pattern across the Mediterranean and Aegean Sea area, giving the author a 
possibility to make an assumption that the activities and goals of the NGOs involved in 
the migration crisis and operating in Italy and Greece were similar in general. This 
assumption made it possible to include the NGOs as a third actor to be researched in this 
work.  
 
The author also considered including political level actors such as PSC or EEAS in this 
research, however the decision was made to include only actors involved “on the ground”. 
The role of the EU institutions cannot be underestimated but they are not directly 
represented in crisis area themselves. Moreover, Frontex, Europol and the NGOs 
frequently work within the same physical space or area, giving ample possibilities to 
understand each other’s work and co-operate well, at least in theory. Thereby political 
level actors were excluded from this research, although it must be noted that some NGOs 
might be also political level actors.  
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3.2. Research design, methods and the sources of data  
 
In preparing for the research the author had to decide what methods to use as a lot has 
been written on migration crisis already and the amount of available material is huge, 
although one might dispute the quality of some of it.  
 
Case-study methodology was used in the research. A broad variety of different research 
studies is called case study research and there is no clear definition (Tumele, 2015). 
However, when discussing case studies, the citation by Robert Yin is frequently used: “A 
case study is an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon (the 
“case”) in depth and within its real-world context, especially when the boundaries 
between phenomenon and context may not be clearly evident” (Yin, 2014). In detail, 
exploratory case study methodology will be used as the interagency approach might not 
have clear and concise set of outcomes (Baxter & Jack, 2008). This type of case study is 
used to explore those situations in which “the intervention being evaluated has no clear, 
single set of outcomes”, as Yin (2014) notes.  
 
To research the interagency approach and the actions of Frontex, Europol and the NGOs 
during the migration crisis, especially in 2015, this research used analysis of different 
published texts. The dilemma here was what analysis technique should be used to achieve 
the best results. Content analysis and discourse analysis were both considered but the aim 
of the paper was not to count predetermined words or paragraphs in text and make 
conclusions based on numbers as such methods were not able to give the best possible 
answer to the hypothesis, although latent qualitative content analysis might include 
certain elements of discourse analysis. This led to mixed text analysis techniques being 
applied to this research. The author established following categories: 
 
x The audience whom the text is meant for 
x The main topic of the text 
x The actors involved in the text 
x The possible perception of the co-operation or interagency approach in the text 
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The categories helped to determine what were the main topics and who were the main 
partners or target groups for the organizations researched. Knowing what and who were 
important for the organizations during the migration crisis helped the author to determine 
the goals and actions of the organizations researched and to gain by that better 
understanding of organizational culture of Frontex, Europol and the NGOs and draw 
conclusions. Media texts and public documents were then analysed according to these 
categories. No numerical values were given or gathered through the research.  
 
The material (legislation, speeches, press releases, articles, risk analyses, etc.) was 
obtained from available public sources (EU databases, agency websites, annual reviews 
of the agencies, the database for European Union legislative acts EUR-LEX, etc.). 
Articles from news agencies and newspapers were used as well. When using media texts, 
the author chose sources that are known for their credibility (e.g. BBC, Politico, The 
Guardian, etc) (see Annex 1). The material mostly covers the actions of the year of 2015, 
although some material also gives insight to modern day as well, as the crisis is still 
ongoing. The number of irregular immigrants reaching the shores of Europe may have 
decreased but the number of people trying to reach Europe who are waiting for their 
opportunity in neighbouring African countries (Libya, Morocco, etc) has not decreased 
(Frontex, 2017).  
 
The validity of research methods and data analysis was an important issue in this work. 
Although the abundance of data concerning the migration crisis and the actors involved 
may be overwhelming at first, co-operation and the possible implementation of the 
interagency approach is perceived differently by each actor. Hence the author decided to 
apply document analysis as a research method. Several authors have brought forward the 
issue of bias when analysing documents, both in the researcher and the creator of the 
document as well (O’Leary, 2014). Secondly, as Bowen (2009) notes, the data of the 
document should not be considered necessarily precise, accurate or complete recordings 
of events that have occurred. The author wanted to establish if possible similarities or 
differences in goals and tasks of the actors somehow influenced the implementation of 
comprehensive approach. Furthermore, the difference in perceiving threat or danger 
might influence the way people or organizations see the situation.   
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3.2.1. Selection of criteria 
 
To either prove or disprove the hypothesis, the author had put forward two research 
questions, which were looked into from the three aspects of migration crisis: 
 
x activities in hotspots 
x activities in border crossing points (BCPs) 
x activities in handling the surveillance of vessels on the Mediterranean and Aegean 
Sea 
 
As mentioned, the migration crisis consists of several aspects which cannot be scrutinized 
in a single paper, therefore a choice had to be made. The author chose the criteria 
mentioned above due to the fact that these aspects have been among the most debated and 
outstanding issues during the migration crisis. The nature of various activities in hotspots 
have been fiercely debated by all actors, similarly emotional “blame game” has been 
fought over the surveillance of vessels on the Mediterranean. In addition all the actors 
researched have been actively involved in these aspects (EU agencies are working side 
by side in hotspots and BCPs with the NGOS, similarly all actors are involved in the 
surveillance issue).   
 
European Agenda on Migration will be given special attention in this paper as it was of 
vital importance in the context of interagency co-operation during the migration crisis. 
The Agenda established the framework within which the crisis was to be managed 
(including introducing key points for more efficient management of migration, 
establishing hotspot approach, etc) and was therefore an important instrument of 
interagency co-operation. As already noted in this paper, co-operation is essential in 
efficient crisis management and for this reason the Agenda must be considered a 
milestone in the management of migration crisis as it was the first time when the EU 
provided a complete plan which not only laid down the framework for operational co-
operation but also provided member states with policy guidelines (relocation programme 
of migrants, renewal of Dublin system of asylum seekers, etc), therefore being an 
essential political agenda.  
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3.3. European Agenda on Migration 
 
On May 13th, 2015, in response to increasing number of migrants crossing the 
Mediterranean, the European Commission approved the European Agenda on Migration, 
which for the first time introduced the hotspot approach (European Agenda on Migration 
2015), which, in essence, was a working space for officers from Frontex, EASO and 
Europol to work together to register, identify and fingerprint the incoming migrants 
(European Agenda on Migration 2015). These working spaces were to be located at key 
arrival points in frontline member states such as Italy and Greece (European Agenda on 
Migration, 2017). Two other EU agencies are involved in hotspots: “Eurojust supports 
the cooperation between the Member States’ judicial authorities to dismantle and 
prosecute the smuggling and trafficking networks. Eurojust facilitates the use of judicial 
cooperation, European Arrest Warrants, joint investigation teams and coordination 
centres to ensure an EU judicial response. euLISA provides ICT expertise based on its 
operational management of the Eurodac system for registration of biometric data from 
asylum seekers and those irregularly crossing the external borders of the EU. It also 
assists national authorities to accelerate the registration process through optimal use of 
technologies” (Frontex, 2017). Of note is the fact that migrants who have been processed 
in hotspots are at times housed in hotspots and guarded by local authorities (either by 
police or army units), a fact which was later heavily criticized by several NGOs.  
 
Moreover, various NGOs also established their offices at hotspots, providing migrants 
with advice and assistance in several aspects (legal, linguistic, etc). Hence all the actors 
researched in this paper are working together in the same area, making possible co-
operation easier.  
 
Furthermore, the Agenda introduced four key points how to manage migration better:  
 
x Reducing the incentives of irregular migration 
x Saving lives and securing external borders 
x Stressing the need for strong common asylum policy  
x The need for new legal migration policy 
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These points could not have been achieved successfully without implementing the 
comprehensive approach. When talking about reducing the incentives, the Agenda 
stresses the need to co-operate with third countries and addressing the root causes of 
migration together with the fight against human traffickers within these countries. 
Furthermore, the Agenda underlines the fact that the work of the agencies will be 
complementary to one another (European Agenda on Migration, 2015). This shows the 
Commission’s intent to use comprehensive approach in hotspot approach and the 
assumption that the agencies will work together. “Tools of comprehensive approach” are 
mentioned in the Agenda, although they have not been mentioned or described in detail, 
leading to an opinion that all the EU agencies, institutions and means available at their 
disposal are considered as tools of the comprehensive approach in this context.  
 
The Agenda therefore sets the basis for interagency cooperation between Frontex and 
Europol as both were heavily involved in the crisis from the beginning. Furthermore, the 
co-operation between all EU agencies and institutions is underlined as of crucial 
importance if the crisis is to be managed successfully. Interestingly, the Agenda does not 
mention the NGOs in any context. Although the importance of saving lives and offering 
protection for those in need is vehemently underlined, the activities of NGOs or 
expectations towards their actions are missing from the document. European Agenda on 
Migration established the base for crisis management in the migration crisis by 
introducing tools and means for the actors involved. Although its political success can be 
debated (the document was heavily criticized for establishing the relocation programme), 
the introduced tools for migration crisis in front line member states, such as the hotspot 
approach and interagency co-operation have been of vital importance.  
 
The importance of cooperation in the area of migration, asylum and security had been 
long stressed by the EU. The Internal Security Strategy stated clearly “During its 
operations, Frontex comes across key information on criminals involved in trafficking 
networks. Currently, however, this information cannot be further used for risk analyses 
or to better target future joint operations. Moreover, relevant data on suspected criminals 
do not reach the competent national authorities or Europol for further investigation. 
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Likewise, Europol cannot share information from its analytical work files. Based on 
experience and in the context of the EU's overall approach to information management, 
the Commission considers that enabling Frontex to process and use this information, with 
a limited scope and in accordance with clearly defined personal data management rules, 
will make a significant contribution to dismantling criminal organisations. However, this 
should not create any duplication of tasks between Frontex and Europol” (Internal 
Security Strategy, 2010).  
 
European Border and Coast Guard Agency Frontex 
Frontex was created in 2004 as “the European Agency for the Management of Operational 
Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European 
Union Frontex” (Frontex, 2017). In 2016 Regulation 2016/1624 established Frontex, the 
European Border and Coast Guard Agency. Its main tasks include (Frontex, 2017): 
 
x Joint operations and rapid interventions at EU’s external borders  
x Risk analysis  
x Monitoring the situation at the borders 
 
Looking at the tasks it is obvious why the EU underlines interagency approach and co-
operation, in this case by Europol and Frontex. By 2015 smuggling people had become 
lucrative business, criminal networks had been created. Frontex alone simply would not 
have been able to handle the crisis as it lacked necessary means and resources, therefore 
Europol joined the effort, as it is tasked with combatting serious international organized 
crime.  
 
Europol 
Europol had been created to co-ordinate the efforts of EU MS in their fight against 
organized crime in its different forms. Trafficking in human beings is identified by 
Europol as one of the main security threats (Europol, 2017), moreover Europol was able 
to rely on intelligence from its member states. Whilst guarding the borders and 
apprehending human traffickers are pivotal, taking care of already arrived migrants was 
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not the task for Frontex or Europol. Various non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
were ready to come in and help to accommodate and take care of the migrants. 
 
NGOs are now recognised as key third sector actors on the landscapes of development, 
human rights, humanitarian action, environment, and many other areas of public action, 
from the post-2004 tsunami reconstruction efforts in Indonesia, India, Thailand, and Sri 
Lanka, to the 2005 Make Poverty History campaign for aid and trade reform and 
developing country debt cancellation (Lewis, 2010). NGOs have been and are still highly 
praised for their humanitarian work and saving countless lives, on other hand, however, 
during the migration crisis they have also been criticised by authorities for assisting 
smugglers in bringing migrants to Europe and providing means to do so in a large scale.  
 
3.4. Activities in hotspots 
 
According to the European Agenda on Migration, EU agencies established five hotspots 
in the Greek islands (Lesvos, Samos, Leros, Chios and Kos) and five in Italy (Taranto, 
Pozzallo, Lampedusa, Trapani and Messina). Official Frontex and EU documents see the 
main actions of Frontex and Europol in hotspots as follows:  
 
x Registering migrants to inform the EU and the hosting member state’s authorities 
how many and from where people are arriving. 
x Identifying migrants so people arriving in Europe would be known not only to the 
hosting member state’s authorities but also to other member states as well, 
preventing migrants from applying for asylum in different EU member states 
x Fingerprinting migrants to ensure arriving migrants claims of their identity can be 
proven and people not needing protection repatriated to their countries of origin 
 
Frontex 
In risk analyses and official publications such as press releases Frontex underlines co-
operation with all parties involved to work towards solving the crisis, excluding no one. 
The public documents of Frontex are meant for broader public to show the intent and 
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plans of the agency to solve the migration crisis as effectively as possible, the main topic 
being the description of how the EU’s external borders are being secured and frontline 
member states assisted (e.g. Frontex news release on 10th December 2015). The actors 
described in Frontex’s public documents are either EU agencies and institutions or 
national authorities, other actors such as the NGOs are almost never mentioned. 
Moreover, Frontex describes its role in saving migrants’ lives and fighting other means 
of trafficking as well, mainly trafficking in drugs (Frontex news release on December 4th, 
2015). An interesting news release was also issued by Frontex on December 4th, 2015 
describing the information exchange agreement signed by Europol and Frontex. The goal 
of the agreement is to prevent and combat cross-border criminal activities by cooperating 
in the planning and implementation of operational activities and also sharing the data of 
suspected criminals collected during the operations (Frontex news release on December 
4th, 2015). This shows how interagency cooperation was deemed inevitable by both 
agencies and achieving the goals of both organizations directly depended on effective co-
operation. Moreover, the same news release describes how the concept of European 
Regional Task Force (EURTF) had been jointly developed by Europol, Frontex, EASO 
and Eurojust. EURTF is described by Europol as “a shared office where the 
representatives of these agencies work together to coordinate the EU assistance to the 
national authorities facing massive migratory pressure. They assist in the identification, 
registration and return as well as criminal investigations of people-smuggling networks 
which takes place either in the ports or in specific reception centres” (Europol, 2015). 
Hotspots established in key arrival points are closely working with EURTF offices.   
 
EURTF office became operational in Sicily, Italy in June 2015 and in Piraeus, Greece in 
January 2016 (Frontex, 2015). The EURTF project is a good example of interagency 
cooperation at EU level and proves that the EU was indeed committed to finding the best 
and most effective solutions to solve the migration crisis and was able to act quickly, if 
needed. One should note that the European Agenda on Migration was approved on May 
13th, 2015 and the first EURTF office opened next month in Italy. Although not directly 
connected, this is another example of interagency co-operation as the EU agencies had 
already established hotspots in Italy and Greece by June 2015 and were looking for 
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possibilities for more efficient co-operation. EURTF office provided them a good 
opportunity for doing that.  
 
Through their public documents Frontex wants the broader public to know they are 
dealing as efficiently as possible with what they perceive as a serious crisis and the 
agency’s goal is to keep EU citizens secure by efficiently controlling the external borders, 
keeping the influx of migrants under control and combatting human trafficking. 
Interagency co-operation (especially with agencies like Europol or EASO) is frequently 
mentioned as an example how the agency is committed to solving the crisis and is using 
not only its own, but also other partners’ means to achieve their goal.  
 
The media texts did not pay much attention to the activities in hotspots, the actions of 
Frontex in frontline member states are discussed in general (what has the agency done 
and what powers granted to handle the situation more effectively, e.g. “EU Frontex force 
to help speed up deportations” (BBC on October 8th, 2015). Therefore, the media can be 
considered neutral towards Frontex in the question of hotspots. However, the media was 
sceptical towards the EU in their handling of the crisis, particularly in the matter of 
returning irregular migrants either to their countries of origin or to Turkey (ibid).  
 
It must be mentioned that the EU-Turkey deal on migration was signed on March 20th, 
2016, not only decreasing significantly the number of arriving irregular migrants to 
Greece but also establishing a working system of returning irregular migrants to Turkey. 
The deal stated, for instance, that for every Syrian migrant returned to Turkey, a Syrian 
migrant from Turkey would be resettled in the European Union. In addition to that system, 
the EU allocated three billion euros in aid to Turkey to help Syrian migrant communities 
there.  
 
Europol 
The official documents of Europol are, in their nature, similar to those of Frontex – the 
need for co-operation with the member states of the EU and other EU agencies is 
underlined and examples of interagency cooperation provided. Europol had created 
European Migrant Smuggling Centre (EMSC) in early 2016 “to support EU member 
states in targeting and dismantling the complex and sophisticated criminal networks 
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involved in migrant smuggling” (Europol, 2016). EMSC is closely co-operating with 
other EU agencies, including Eurojust and Frontex to combat criminal networks in human 
trafficking. 
 
Europol documents do not discuss its involvement or activities in hotspots in detail, 
attention is turned to more strategic initiatives such as EMSC and Joint Operation Mare 
(JOT Mare). This can be explained by the fact that Europol’s task is to combat serious 
international crime and whatever information is gathered by its officers in hotspots, it will 
be considered as classified material and neither the information or the sources and 
methods are revealed even after the successful conclusion of an investigation. Moreover, 
the tasks and goals of Europol in hotspots are not discussed or described in detail, 
however considering the main tasks of the agency, gathering intelligence on human 
traffickers and criminal networks are without a doubt one of the main tasks of the Europol 
officers working in hotspots.  
 
Lack of mention of Europol’s activities in hotspots in Europol’s own documents and 
publications is understandable but somewhat surprisingly the media follows similar trend. 
If an EU agency is mentioned in connection to the migration crisis, then it is Frontex or 
EASO. The media does not mention Europol’s role neither in relation to activities in 
hotspots nor in any other aspect of migration crisis. The role and mentions of Europol in 
the media increase considerably when terrorist attacks are being discussed as media 
perceives the agency as intelligence gathering and organized crime fighting organization. 
Hence the media perceives the role of Europol in the migration crisis differently than the 
agency itself.  
 
NGOs 
The documents of various NGOs describe their goals in hotspots as: 
x Saving people’s lives as EU agencies are not up for the task, moreover as the 
conditions in hotspots are horrifying 
x Taking care of migrants’ rights in Europe as EU agencies’ goals do not include 
caring for the migrants’ rights in hotspots 
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The NGOs frequently underline the fact that migrants are forced to live in hotspots and 
are not allowed to move elsewhere (Caritas Europa position paper on June 16th, 2016). 
The conditions in hotspots are criticized from the human rights point of view as according 
to the Danish Refugee Council the migrants are facing “gaps in information, lack of legal 
assistance, under-identification of vulnerable persons, restricted freedom of movement 
and de facto detention” (Danish Refugee Council on November 15th, 2017). The 
documents available at the websites of the NGOs stress the role of the organizations as 
saviours of people.  
 
Interestingly, when addressing the EU or its agencies in relation to the migration crisis, 
similar to the media, the NGOs do no mention Europol. Frontex, however, is frequently 
mentioned.  
 
Frontex along with Greek authorities is criticized for not letting migrants move to the 
Greek mainland in Greece and keeping the migrants in the islands near Turkey. This is 
considered to be human rights violation by the NGOs and Frontex has frequently been 
blamed for this action. This, however, is a good example of the lack of co-operation and 
communication between Frontex and the NGOs as the decision to keep the migrants in 
the islands was made by the Greek authorities and not Frontex.  
 
Interestingly, the research within media texts did not produce NGOs positive reflections 
on Frontex actions in hotspots and the agency’s actions are always described negatively, 
as it is mostly seen as the main scapegoat for migrants’ troubles. The NGOs often show 
their negativity towards the fingerprinting of migrants, considering it abusive and a 
violation of migrants’ human rights. Moreover, the NGOs accuse Frontex of only being 
interested in border control and not saving lives.  
 
Whereas in official documents Frontex is restrained in their attitude towards the NGOs 
and barely mention them at all. the media texts showed a different world. Quarterly and 
annual risk analyses and publications are considered as the official statements of the 
organization, therefore explaining their restrained tone. The tone in media, however, is 
different as Frontex and the NGOs blame each other, the former for not caring for 
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migrants’ lives and rights, the latter for helping to smuggle people to Europe (Financial 
Times on December 15th, 2016). The dispute comes down to different goals of 
organizations as the main goal for the NGOs was to save people and care for their human 
rights, whereas for Frontex the main goal has been securing the borders and combatting 
human trafficking with Europol. Thereby the difference of goals can be attributed to as 
the main reason for the dispute between Frontex and the NGOs. 
 
3.5. Surveillance of vessels on the Mediterranean and Aegean 
 
Frontex 
Surveillance of vessels in the Mediterranean and Aegean Sea is considered an important 
measure in controlling the borders of Greece and Italy by Frontex. The agency’s official 
documents state that besides combatting human trafficking, search and rescue function is 
another important aspect of surveillance of vessels (Frontex press release on July 5th, 
2017). Frontex’s aim is to show through its official documents that the agency is doing 
all within its capabilities to combat human trafficking and save the lives of the irregular 
migrants as well.  
 
Co-operation with other actors is frequently mentioned, the actors being: 
 
x National authorities of a hosting country, i.e. Italy or Greece 
x Member states of the EU contributing to the mission under the auspices of Frontex 
x Other EU agencies 
 
The co-operation between the authorities of a hosting country and Frontex is frequently 
described positively as profitable for both sides as texts describe the apprehension of 
criminals or rescuing migrants (Frontex press release on July 20th, 2017). Co-operation 
with other agencies is also positively described as being useful for achieving the goals for 
both parties. Europol has not been mentioned often in official texts of Frontex, although 
the cooperation with EU agencies is often underlined by the agency. The NGOs have not 
been mentioned in public documents of Frontex in regard to surveillance of vessels.  
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The analysis of media texts shows that Frontex is indeed mostly involved in two major 
aspects when surveying the vessels in the Mediterranean and Aegean – search and rescue 
of migrants and combatting human trafficking. However, as the executive director of 
Frontex Fabrice Leggeri put it: “While saving lives is a priority, dismantling people-
smuggling networks operating in Libya is part of our mission.” (Frontex press release on 
June 28th, 2016). Media seems to be of similar opinion as Frontex is mentioned for saving 
lives, more importantly the agency is mentioned for blaming various NGOs for smuggling 
people to Europe. This blame game reached political level when executive director of 
Frontex Fabrice Leggeri expressed his concern as NGOs were sending their ships to pick 
up migrants near the Libyan coast (The Guardian on February 27th, 2017). Such action 
was considered to have encouraged human trafficking as the NGOs were picking people 
up from the Libyan waters. Allegations against the NGOs did not come only from Frontex 
as an Italian prosecutor also claimed to have proof of the NGOs smuggling people to 
Italy.  
 
In assistance of Frontex and other relevant EU agencies, the EU launched European Naval 
Force Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED) in 2015, with the goal of search and rescue 
and dismantling smuggler networks. Although ongoing, the success of this mission, 
however, has been debated and cannot be firmly confirmed. Frontex does co-operate with 
EUNAVFOR MED in its surveillance operations and uses its resources for the 
surveillance of vessels in the Mediterranean and Aegean. European Agenda on Migration 
tasks the EU agencies to assist the member states’ authorities in the fight against the 
criminal network of smugglers by capturing and destroying the vessels before they can 
be used to transport people (Agenda on Migration, 2015).  
 
Europol 
According to its media releases the main aim of Europol to survey vessels in 
Mediterranean and Aegean is to combat human trafficking and international organized 
crime which is heavily involved with migrant trafficking. The co-operation with Frontex 
in this field is being underlined as an important tool to achieve Europol’s goals. 
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In March 2015 Europol launched Joint Operation Mare (JOT Mare) in response to the 
migration crisis and increasing number of irregular migrants. This effort was meant to 
enhance the co-operation between Europol, Frontex and member states of the EU to more 
efficiently tackle the challenges brought by the migration crisis (Europol annual review, 
2015). This initiative was described by the Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs 
and Citizenship Dimitris Avramopoulos as “a maritime intelligence centre reinforcing 
actions against people smugglers. The close cooperation between all national and 
European stakeholders will be encouraged in order to pursue further our objectives” 
(Europol, 2015). This joint operation is an example of interagency approach being 
implemented by the EU as the union and its agencies share a common goal of getting the 
migration crisis under control. 
 
Although the joint efforts against people smuggling have been somewhat successful, 
human trafficking has still become more profitable than drug smuggling. One of the 
options how to conceal the payments made to smugglers is to use hawala banking.  
 
Migrants from Islamic countries often use hawala banking, which is widespread in Islam. 
The hawala system is simple – if a person in Syria, for instance, wants to send money to 
his children in Germany, he goes to a certain shop or a person known to handle such 
issues and gives him the cash. Moments later the sender’s child gets a phone call or a text 
message telling him to go to a certain shop in the city he is in and he receives the money 
sent by his father (minus the commission, of course). The simplicity and efficiency of the 
system has made it very popular amongst Muslims and it is widely used in Islamic 
countries.  
 
Hawala is also used in smuggling people as migrants pay their smugglers using the same 
system (EURACTIV, 2017). As interactions in hawala are done either by phone or instant 
message providers (WhatsApp, Messenger, etc), they are almost impossible to trace, 
especially if law enforcement agencies begin their investigations considerable time later. 
This enables smugglers to move people from one place to another without financial trace.  
When concentrating on surveillance of vessels in the Mediterranean, the media mostly 
focuses on the argument between Frontex and the NGOs, Europol is not mentioned. As 
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the media perceives the role of Europol to be more involved with dismantling criminal 
networks and not directly involved in maritime surveillance.  
 
The NGOs 
The main goal of the NGOs using their own vessels to save people arriving by sea from 
Libya, Turkey, Egypt and other countries is to save human lives. How irregular migrants 
arrived in these countries and how they were able to cross the sea or find vessels to go to 
the sea is not relevant for the NGOs as for them it is clearly a humanitarian crisis where 
lives are in danger. Some of the NGOs conduct their own rescue operations and are 
therefore critical towards Frontex and national authorities of Greece and Italy as their 
operations are deemed as meant for border control, not saving people. As the goal of 
Frontex is to secure the external borders of the EU and Europol is tasked with dismantling 
organized criminal networks involved in smuggling, the goals of the actors do not match 
or overlap. Whereas EU agencies are interested in knowing who are coming to Europe 
and procedures have been established to ensure that, the NGOs are trying to protect the 
“human rights of migrants” and provide migrants with all possible assistance beginning 
with food and ending with legal aid, translation, etc.  
 
According to their own texts, the NGOs are actively saving lives as the EU and other 
actors are either not able or not willing to do that. Furthermore, migrants saved by Frontex 
or national authorities will not have their human rights guaranteed, as the NGOs have 
underlined for several times. Such approach puts the NGOs at odds with Frontex, other 
EU agencies and national authorities.  
 
 
3.6. Activities in Border Crossing Points 
 
Compared to previous two topics, activities in BCPs did not receive a lot of attention from 
any of the actors involved. Most irregular migrants arrived in Greece and Italy by sea, 
thereby it is understandable that issues concerning hotspots and the surveillance of vessels 
on sea were more crucial to EU agencies and the NGOs. Furthermore, when analysing 
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different BCPs, it is important to notice that migrants coming to Greece and Italy by land 
did not use conventional BCPs similarly to their comrades who reached Europe by sea. 
The NGOs criticized fiercely the national authorities of EU countries who were trying to 
stop migrants from crossing internal borders. As crossing the border between Schengen 
countries where the surveillance of borders was non-existent or weak, was easy, this led 
to a situation where due to mass border crossings some countries like Slovenia or Hungary 
decided to erect fences at their borders to control illegal border crossings, which in turn 
was heavily criticized by the NGOs as they would have preferred the removal of all 
possible obstacles from migrants’ path. As Frontex or Europol were and are not tasked 
with securing the internal borders of the EU, the agencies did not come to contact with 
the NGOs on the issue of internal borders.  
 
Frontex 
According to its documents, Frontex sees its role as assistant to national authorities in 
BCPs. The agency has issued 3 news releases over a period of two years describing the 
apprehension of criminals and dismantling criminal networks. In addition, risk analyses 
also only describe the situation at borders and do not give many details on activities in 
BCPs. Frontex shows through its texts that the cooperation between them and the national 
authorities of EU member states is sustainable and produces results.  
 
Compared to activities in hotspots and surveillance of vessels, the media has not taken up 
any interest on Frontex’s activities in BCPs. As mentioned before, this is understandable 
as Frontex does not have a role in securing the internal borders of the EU member states.  
 
Europol 
Europol has not produced any documents related to its activities in BCPs. Considering 
the fact that the agency’s task is to dismantle criminal networks and combat human 
trafficking, it does not come as a surprise. Lack of public documents does not mean lack 
of activities of Europol at BCPs in the context of the migration crisis, as the agency’s goal 
is to collect information and data, which would help dismantle criminal human trafficking 
networks.  
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The NGOs 
When discussing the issue of BCPs, the NGOs have not concentrated on Frontex or 
Europol. As mentioned, the agencies have not either been active in BCPs or have been 
active using other means, making it impossible for the NGOs to comment on the work of 
Frontex and Europol. Furthermore, as most of the arrivals took place by boats over the 
sea border, BCPs which are located on land borders, received little attention from the 
NGOs. 
  
 
4. Discussion 
 
A lot has been written on migration crisis of 2015 and the EU’s handling of it, however 
the topic of interagency approach during the crisis has been barely touched, if at all 
mentioned. EU is a complex structure and at times decision-making and efficient 
interagency communication might be difficult to achieve. 
 
This paper looked at interagency co-operation from the organizational culture point of 
view. As established, law enforcement organizations have distinct organizational culture, 
which is based on strict adherence to norms and values. If an order is given, it must be 
carried out precisely as ordered, without much considering the context officers are 
operating within. Given the character and general tasks of law enforcement, such 
strictness is understandable, however it might put police and other similar organizations 
at odds with groups and people operating in the same community as the goals of other 
groups might differ from those of law enforcement. Furthermore, the perception of the 
situation is essential. During the migration crisis Frontex and Europol understood the 
crisis as a situation where border security was at grave risk and migrants arriving in 
Greece and Italy might be a security risk. Moreover, as international organized crime was 
heavily involved in human trafficking during the crisis, it added another dimension to 
look into for Frontex and Europol. 
 
When looking at the actions undertaken by the EU in 2015 and later, an interesting fact 
is revealed. Considering the fact that 2015 was the first year when the migration crisis 
first made the headlines and the number of irregular migrants crossing into the EU grew 
more than six times compared to 2014, the EU responded relatively quickly by 
introducing the Agenda on Migration. Furthermore, the Agenda serves as an excellent 
example of interagency co-operation as the EU agencies were given a framework to 
operate within and a set of goals to achieve. One should take into consideration that by 
early 2015 the crisis had not reached its peak. As the Commission did not seek previous 
approval of the Agenda, it can be considered as a rather successful measure. Although 
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some member states vehemently opposed some of the measures, namely the relocation of 
migrants, the Agenda can be considered as a good guideline how to tackle the crisis.  
 
The paper looked into the actions and goals of Frontex and Europol and found them 
similar, as both agencies perceived the situation as a security crisis. This, to an extent, 
was to be expected as both are agencies of the EU and their goals contribute to general 
goal of the EU which was to control the external borders and fight human trafficking. In 
their official documents both agencies are quite restrained and polite towards each other 
and value the co-operation with the other agency when the topic of co-operation comes 
up. This is understandable as Frontex and Europol work closely with each other and good 
working relationship is expected to achieve the results for both agencies.  
 
When looking at the media texts, the situation is similar. The relationship between EU 
agencies is not always good and media has been used at times to gain the upper hand, 
however, in the context of the migration crisis Europol and Frontex have not used the 
media to refer to possible problems in their co-operation, in the contrary, the cooperation 
has been described as efficient and successful. Such approach cannot always be taken for 
granted in crisis situations as problems occur on both operational and strategic level and 
the temptation to use media to gain an advantage might be too sweet to turn down. In this 
crisis, however, such problems were not brought to the attention of media.  
 
Looking at the interagency approach from the NGOs’ point of view, the situation could 
not have been more different. Frontex and Europol do not criticize the NGOs in their 
official public documents, however looking at the media, the situation is different. Firstly, 
as expected, a lot of emotion is involved. The NGOs are especially critical towards 
Frontex who they see as the main culprit in the death and misery of arriving migrants. 
Although the EU and its agencies are committed to saving lives according to their public 
documents and indeed, the vessels of Frontex are patrolling the Mediterranean and 
Aegean Sea to help migrants and assist in case of possible shipwrecks, the NGOs find it 
unsatisfactory and consider the activities of Frontex both in hotspots and at sea hostile 
towards the migrants with the only goal of securing the borders and not caring for the 
migrants.  
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Interestingly, as one of the main goals of Frontex is to control the external borders of the 
EU effectively, the criticism by the NGOs is rather surprising as Frontex is not only 
expected to conduct the surveillance of vessels but also stop the migrants before they 
could reach the shores of Greece or Italy undetected. Moreover, helping vulnerable and 
other people in need is also an important agenda for Frontex, so close co-operation 
between the agency and the NGOs would be a logical assumption. This shows that the 
NGOs do not take into account the goals of Frontex in their work and are trying to achieve 
their goals by showing the efforts of the EU as punitive and abusive. It is important to 
note that although Frontex, Europol and the NGOs are all actively involved in solving the 
migration crisis and they need each other to achieve their respective goals, the difference 
in perceiving the crisis and diverging goals have hindered co-operation a lot.   
 
As all actors involved have different goals and perceive the crisis differently, the criticism 
towards other actors (the NGOs vs EU agencies) is almost inevitable. Both EU agencies 
perceive the crisis as a security problem (people are entering EU illegally, their identities 
and intentions are not known, the facilitators are part of a large and well-organized 
criminal network, etc). Making borders secure and breaking the networks of human 
trafficking have been the main goals for both Frontex and Europol. The NGOs, however, 
see the crisis as a humanitarian problem and want to bring as many people to Europe as 
possible, regardless of their background and status, so these people would be safe from 
horrors of abuse and war. EU agencies are also committed to saving lives, however they 
are interested in bringing people to hotspots where they are registered and accounted for, 
as the goal is to control the migration flow. The NGOs see these actions as violations of 
human rights as the migrants should be allowed to move around freely, regardless of their 
status. As the goals of organizations did not match, conflicts followed, as was shown in 
text analysis.  
 
Not surprisingly, the EU had underlined several times the importance of saving lives at 
sea. The NGOs, by their own account, have exactly the same goal, so this should be a 
field where co-operation was to be expected. The reality, however, is different, as Frontex 
and the NGOs have blamed each other through media and no effort on co-operation has 
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been made, at least not in public. Activities conducted in co-operation between Frontex 
and the NGOs would have been beneficial to both parties as it would have given them the 
opportunity to prove their original intent and use the capabilities of other partners. One 
must consider, however, the accusations of Frontex and at times of national authorities, 
which have quite bluntly said that the NGOs are smuggling people to Europe themselves. 
This aspect would explain the lack of co-operation as no EU agency or national authority 
would ever agree to breaking a law or smuggling people to Europe.   
 
The relationship between the NGOs and Europol is more peaceful. It can be explained by 
the fact that Europol is not so visibly involved in the activities as their goal is to break the 
criminal networks of smugglers. These activities cannot be observed or be known by third 
parties in order for them to be successful, so the NGOs do not come into contact with 
Europol so often as they do with Frontex. Moreover, the migrants at sea and in hotspots 
and BCPs mostly come in contact with Frontex officers, so the critique is mostly 
concentrated on the latter.    
 
In the introductory part of the thesis the author set a hypothesis which stated that different 
organizational culture and perception of crisis prevented the effective implementation of 
interagency approach. The paper showed that Frontex and Europol perceived the crisis as 
a security crisis, whereas the NGOs perceived it as a humanitarian crisis. Furthermore, 
Frontex and Europol both have organizational cultures similar to law enforcement 
organizations. Both agencies also second staff from EU member states to crisis areas. In 
their respective countries these seconded officers work as policemen or border guards, 
i.e. for military-style or law enforcement organizations. Furthermore, the seconded 
officers are given security-related tasks (registering, identifying, debriefing) in crisis 
areas, which might even more enhance their perception of security crisis.  
 
The NGOs perceived the migration crisis as a humanitarian issue, where human lives 
were at risk and even after arriving in Europe, the migrants’ rights were not guaranteed 
and protected. As the NGOs concentrated on saving lives and protecting migrants’ rights, 
their actions inevitably collided with those of Frontex and Europol as these agencies had 
different goals. Furthermore, the organizational culture of the NGOs is fundamentally 
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different from that of Frontex and Europol. Small NGOs rely on donations and funding 
from projects (some of them are created for short-term projects), their agendas might be 
short term and they are staffed by volunteers. Although big NGOs have large budgets and 
they are able to plan long-term, the organizational culture of the NGOs is different from 
that of law enforcement organizations. The NGOs as a rule do not have long traditions 
and they do not adhere to strict norms and rules.  
 
The paper showed that the NGOs had different perception of the migration crisis than 
Frontex and Europol. Moreover, the NGOs organizational culture is also different from 
that of Frontex and Europol, which prevented the implementation of interagency 
approach between these three actors during the migration crisis.  
  
5. Conclusion 
 
This paper analysed the implementation of interagency approach during the migration 
crisis of 2015. Three actors involved in the crisis were selected (Frontex, Europol and the 
NGOs). The author set a hypothesis that “different organizational cultures and 
understanding of crisis prevented the effective implementation of interagency approach 
between the NGOs and Frontex and Europol during the migration crisis”. This hypothesis 
was researched using following research questions:  
 
x How did the NGOs, Frontex and Europol perceive the migration crisis? 
 
x How did their respective organizational culture affect the actions of Frontex, 
Europol and the NGOs during the migration crisis? 
 
The paper showed that the hypothesis was correct as EU agencies perceived the crisis as 
a security issue and the NGOs as a humanitarian issue, preventing effective 
implementation of interagency approach. Moreover, differences in respective 
organizational cultures enhanced the problems the NGOs, Frontex and Europol had to 
face when interacting with each other. The paper found that the co-operation between 
Frontex and Europol was efficient as both organizations not only had similar goals and 
perceptions but also shared similar organizational culture.  
 
The paper first concentrated on the meaning of crisis and modern crisis management, 
showing that the meaning and perception of crisis has changed over time and more crises 
will be transnational, hence impossible to manage without implementing the interagency 
approach and effective co-operation. Different actors, however, find it difficult to co-
operate with other actors as their goals do not match or even overlap and furthermore, the 
perception of crisis varies. Thirdly, the paper found that the organizational culture of 
different actors might be altogether different. All of this makes interagency co-operation 
very difficult to implement.  
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The paper analysed the implementation of interagency approach during the migration 
crisis through the activities of Frontex, Europol and the NGOs as they were heavily 
involved during the crisis. Three criteria were selected: the activities in hotspots, the 
activities in the surveillance of vessels on the Mediterranean and Aegean and the activities 
in BCPs.  
 
The paper showed that EU agencies co-operated with each other as they had similar goals 
and perceptions but were unable to do so with the NGOs as their perception of the crisis 
was different. When looking at the activities in hotspots and in the surveillance of vessels, 
the NGOs were especially critical of Frontex, as the agency’s actions did not enable the 
NGOs to perform its tasks. The difference in goals led to public conflict, where both sides 
accused each other in media. The NGOs remained similarly active in BCPs as they 
criticized the actions of national authorities. As Frontex was in a less visible role in BCPs 
at external borders and had no role at internal borders, the NGOs did not come into 
conflict with Frontex or Europol when activities in BCPs were concerned.  
 
Frontex, Europol and the NGOs are and will be heavily involved in solving the migration 
crisis and similar complex crises in the future and they need each other to achieve their 
respective goals. This, however, also brings forward an interesting dilemma – as the goals 
of researched actors were and are diverging and perceptions differ, the co-operation 
proved to be difficult to implement.  
 
As the essence of crisis keeps changing and one actor (state, organization, etc) is often 
not able to manage the crisis on its own, we must consider interagency co-operation as an 
inevitable measure for successful crisis management. Although actors involved will have 
diverging goals and perceptions in a crisis situation, a compromise must be found to 
ensure safety and security of all people involved. The compromise, however, will be 
difficult to negotiate, as the organizational cultures of the NGOs and military or law 
enforcement organizations vary. This problem within civil-military co-operation needs to 
be addressed and studied further to make the co-operation between the NGOs and military 
or law enforcement organizations more efficient.
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6. Summary 
 
The thesis looked into the implementation of interagency approach by Frontex, Europol 
and the NGOs during the migration crisis of 2015. The thesis set a hypothesis that 
different perception of the migration crisis and organizational cultures prevented efficient 
implementation of interagency approach by actors involved. To prove or disprove the 
hypothesis research questions were set forward. The author researched the topic by 
analysing media texts and texts issued by Frontex, Europol and the NGOs, focusing on 
three categories: activities in hotspots, activities in the surveillance of vessels in the 
Mediterranean and Aegean and activities in BCPs. The research proved that the NGOs 
perceived the migration crisis as a humanitarian crisis, whereas Frontex and Europol 
perceived the crisis as a security crisis. Furthermore, the organizational culture of the 
NGOs differs from that of Frontex and Europol who have organizational cultures similar 
to that of law enforcement organizations.  
 
As the understanding of crisis and organizational cultures were different among the actors 
researched, the hypothesis was proven to be correct. As the organizations researched have 
different organizational cultures and also different perceptions of the migration crisis, 
interagency approach was not implemented. As the essence of crisis keeps changing and 
one actor (state, organization, etc) is often not able to manage the crisis on its own, 
interagency co-operation must be considered as an inevitable measure for successful 
crisis management. Although actors involved will have different goals and perceptions in 
a crisis situation, a compromise must be found to ensure safety and security of all people 
involved. The compromise, however, will be difficult to negotiate, as the organizational 
cultures of the NGOs and military or law enforcement organizations vary. This problem 
within civil-military co-operation needs to be addressed and studied further to make the 
co-operation between the NGOs and military or law enforcement organizations more 
efficient. 
59 
 
References 
 
Afouxenidis, A., Petrou, M., Kandylis, G., Tramountanis, A., Giannaki, D. (2017) 
Dealing with a Humanitarian Crisis: Refugees on the Eastern EU Border of the Island of 
Lesvos Journal of Applied Security Research Vol. 12 , Iss. 1 Retrieved from 
http://web.b.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.utlib.ut.ee/ehost/detail/detail?vid=22&sid=fab2272
d-2154-44c4-bbd3-b42a770eee2c%40pdc-v-
sessmgr01&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#AN=120686940&db=a9h 
on February 10th, 2018  
 
Annual review of Europol of 2015. (2015) Retrieved from 
https://www.europol.europa.eu/annual_review/2015/people-in-danger.html on March 
18th, 2018 
 
Batora, J., Blockmans, S., Ferhatovic, E, Peters, I., Rieker, P, Stambol, E. (2016).  
Understanding the EU’s crisis response toolbox and decision-making processes 
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs EUNPACK Retrieved from 
http://www.eunpack.eu/sites/default/files/deliverables/Deliverable%204.1.pdf on March 
24th, 2018 
 
Baubion, C. (2013). OECD risk management: strategic crisis management. Strategic 
crisis management OECD report. Paris, France: The Organisation for Economic Co- 
operation and Development. Retrieved from https://www.mmc.com/content/dam/mmc-
web/Files/Strategic-Crisis-Management-paper-July-2013.pdf on March 21st, 2018 
 
Baxter, P., & Jack, S. (2008). Qualitative Case Study Methodology: Study Design and 
Implementation for Novice Researchers. The Qualitative Report, 13(4), 544-559. 
Retrieved from http://nsuworks.nova.edu/tqr/vol13/iss4/2 on March 21st, 2018 
 
Beger, N., Herrberg, A., Uebber, M., & Weiss, S. (2007). Partners in conflict prevention 
and crisis management: EU and NGO cooperation. Gütersloh, Germany: Bertelsmann 
Stiftung. Retrieved from http://eplo.org/wp-
60 
 
content/uploads/2017/05/EPLO_Report_Partners-in-Conflict-Prevention-and-Crisis- 
Management.pdf on March 20th, 2018 
 
Birkland, T. (2009). Disasters, Catastrophes, and Policy Failure in the Homeland 
Security Era, Review of Policy Research, Volume 26, Number 4, pp. 423–438 Retrieved 
from 
http://web.b.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.utlib.ut.ee/ehost/detail/detail?vid=20&sid=fab2272
d-2154-44c4-bbd3-b42a770eee2c%40pdc-v-
sessmgr01&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#AN=41888937&db=bth on 
March 29th, 2018 
 
Blockmans, S., Carrera, S., Gros, D., Guild. E (2015) The EU’s Response to the Refugee 
Crisis Taking Stock and Setting Policy Priorities CEPS essay No.20 Retrieved from  
https://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=935027064086092000094099082091127
1000380120720040100290870160720930060700711160680671060960031260501111
2509207308512602110008201902208700305411702411109212207512109002903404
3020079091023115029120084020004097091083112024001028066090024024116080
085083113&EXT=pdf  
on March 18th, 2018 
 
Boin, A., Ansell, C., & Keller, A. (2010). Managing transboundary crises: identifying the 
building blocks of an effective response system. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis 
Management, 19(4), 195-197. Retrieved from 
http://web.b.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.utlib.ut.ee/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=4&sid=f
ab2272d-2154-44c4-bbd3-b42a770eee2c%40pdc-v-sessmgr01 on March 18th, 2018 
 
Boin, A., Ekengren, M. and Rhinard, M. (2013). EU as Crisis Manager: Patterns and 
Prospects Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Retrieved from 
http://journals.sagepub.com.ezproxy.utlib.ut.ee/doi/full/10.1177/0020702014551522 on 
March 29th, 2018 
 
61 
 
Boin, A., & Rhinard, M. (2008). Managing transboundary crisis: what role for the 
European Union? International studies review, 10(1), 4-5. Retrieved from 
http://web.b.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.utlib.ut.ee/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=7&sid=f
ab2272d-2154-44c4-bbd3-b42a770eee2c%40pdc-v-sessmgr01 on March 17th, 2018   
 
British Broadcasting Corporation. (2016) How is The Migrant Crisis Dividing EU 
Countries? March 4th   Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-
34278886 on March 10th, 2018  
 
Chisholm, D. (1989). Coordination without hierarchy: informal structures in multi- 
organizational systems. Berkley, United States: University of California Press. Retrieved 
from http://ark.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/ft4d5nb38m/ on March 17th, 2018  
 
de Coning, C. (2007) Civil-Military Coordination Practices and Approaches Within 
United Nations Peace Operations Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, Fall 2007, 
Vol. 10, Issue 1  
 
Council of the European Union. (2005) Convention 10900/05. Retrieved from 
https://ec.europa.eu/anti-fraud/sites/antifraud/files/docs/body/prumtr.pdf on March 20th, 
2018 
 
Council of the European Union. (2015) European Union Internal Security Strategy 2015 
– 2020 Retrieved from http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-9798-2015-
INIT/en/pdf on March 22nd, 2018   
 
Egnell, R. (2009) Complex Peace Operations and Civil-Military Relations: Winning the 
Peace New York: Routledge  
 
Erlanger, S., Smale, A. (2015) Europe’s Halting Response to Migrant Crisis Draws 
Criticism as Toll Mounts Retrieved from The New York Times, August 28th  
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/29/world/europe/europe-migrant-refugee-crisis.html 
on March 20th, 2018 
62 
 
 
Erlanger, S., Rubin, A. (2016) Salah Abdeslam, Suspect in Paris Attacks, Is Captured in 
Brussels Retrieved from The New York Times, March 18th 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/19/world/europe/salah-abdeslam-belgium-
apartment.html on March 20th, 2018 
 
EU Global Strategy (2016). Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. 
Brussels: High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-
President of the European Commission. Retrieved from 
https://eeas.europa.eu/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf on March 22nd, 2018   
 
European Agenda on Migration. (2015) Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/home-
affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-
migration/background-
information/docs/communication_on_the_european_agenda_on_migration_en.pdf on 
March 20th, 2018  
 
CMPD on European External Action Service (2017). Retrieved from 
https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp/5433_en on 
March 24th, 2018 
 
European Parliament and Council of the European Union. Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 establishing a 
Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders 
(Schengen Borders Code). (2006) Official Journal L 105/1, 13 April Retrieved from 
http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:105:0001:0032:EN:PDF on 
April 2nd, 2018 
 
Europol (2017). Frontex and Europol agree to exchange information on cross-border 
crime.  Retrieved from https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-and-
63 
 
europol-agree-to-exchange-information-on-cross-border-crime-dEyVpQ on March 25th, 
2018 
 
Frontex (2015).  
 
Frontex (2017). Mission & Tasks. Retrieved from https://frontex.europa.eu/about-
frontex/mission-tasks/ on March 30th, 2018 
 
Georgiev, A., Egenhofer, C. and Behrens, A. (2011). Coping with Global Environmental 
Change, Disasters and Security: Threats, Challenges, Vulnerabilities and Risks. Berlin: 
Springer.  
 
Gheciu, A. (2011). Divided Partners: The Challenges of NATO-NGO Co-operation in 
Peacebuilding Operations Global Governance 17, pp 95-113 
 
Hart, P., & Sundelius, B. (2013). Crisis management revisited: A new agenda for 
research, training and capacity building within Europe. Cooperation and conflict, 48(3), 
444-461. Retrieved from 
http://journals.sagepub.com.ezproxy.utlib.ut.ee/doi/full/10.1177/0010836713485711 on 
March 22nd, 2018 
 
Horii, S. (2016) The effect of Frontex's risk analysis on the European border controls 
European Politics and Society Vol 17 Issue 2 Retrieved from http://www-tandfonline-
com.ezproxy.utlib.ut.ee/doi/full/10.1080/23745118.2016.1121002 on February 11th, 2018 
 
Huysmans, J. (2006) The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, migration and asylum in the 
EU (Oxon: Routledge).  
 
Klein, N. (2007) The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism New York: 
Metropolitan  
 
64 
 
Kuhn, M. (2008). The System of EU Crisis Management: From Bringing Peace to 
Establishing Democracy? Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, Volume 13, 
2009, p. 247-266 Retrieved from http://www.mpil.de/files/pdf2/mpunyb_07_kuhn.pdf on 
March 29th, 2018 
 
Leonard, D. (2012). Rethinking the management of large – scale national risks. Geneva: 
First OECD/ Swiss Federal Chancellery Workshop on Strategic Crisis Management.  
 
Lewis, David (2010) Nongovernmental Organizations, Definition and History. Retrieved 
from 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/302391474_Nongovernmental_Organizations
_Definition_and_History on March 22nd, 2018 
 
Neal, Andrew W. (2009) Securitization and Risk at the EU Border: The Origins of 
Frontex JCMS 2009 Volume  47. Number 2. pp 333-356 
 
The Oxford Living Dictionary of English Retrieved from  
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/crisis on March 25th, 2018 
 
Perrow, C (1999) Normal Accidents: Living With High-Risk Technologies. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press 
 
Pielmus, C. (2015) An Ethnographic Approach to the Organizational Culture of Law 
Enforcement Training Schools A Case Study Revista Academiei Fortelor Terestre No 4 
(80)/2015 Retrieved from 
http://web.b.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.utlib.ut.ee/ehost/detail/detail?vid=9&sid=fab2272d
-2154-44c4-bbd3-b42a770eee2c%40pdc-v-
sessmgr01&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#AN=112006904&db=a9h 
on March 25th, 2018  
 
65 
 
Regine, P. (2017) Harmonization by risk analysis? Frontex and the risk based governance 
of European border control Journal of European Integration Vol 39:6 pp 689-706 
Retrieved from 
http://www-tandfonline-
com.ezproxy.utlib.ut.ee/doi/full/10.1080/07036337.2017.1320553  
on March 20th, 2018 
 
The Schengen acquis - Agreement between the Governments of the States of the Benelux 
Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the 
gradual abolition of checks at their common borders (1985). EUR-LEX Retrieved from 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A42000A0922%2801%29 on March 30th, 2018 
 
Shaw G. L., Harrald, J. R. (2004). Required competencies for executive level business 
crisis and continuity managers. Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency 
Management, 1, 1. Retrieved from 
http://web.a.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.utlib.ut.ee/ehost/detail/detail?vid=4&sid=378ca5d2
-558c-4dd2-abd8-
2618b3b1cd61%40sessionmgr4010&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#A
N=29042889&db=eoah on March 30th, 2018  
 
Spily, P., Necas, P., Žak, M. (2011). Comprehensive Approach: The road for Complex 
Crisis Resolution. Revista Academiei Fortelor Terestre No 1 61/2011 Retrieved from 
http://web.b.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.utlib.ut.ee/ehost/detail/detail?vid=11&sid=fab2272
d-2154-44c4-bbd3-b42a770eee2c%40pdc-v-
sessmgr01&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#AN=59435648&db=a9h on 
March 25th, 2018 
 
Thomas, K., Bergethon, P. R., & Reimer, M. (2010). Interoperability for first responders 
and emergency management: definition, need, and the path forward. World Medical & 
Health Policy, 2(3), 163. Retrieved from 
66 
 
https://www.bumc.bu.edu/bmcm/files/2012/02/Interoperability-for-First-Responders-
and-Emergency-Management.pdf on March 22nd, 2018   
 
Treaty on European Union. (2007) Retrieved from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A12012M%2FTXT on March 25th, 2018 
 
Tumele, S. (2015) Case Study Research International Journal of Sales, Retailing and 
Marketing Vol. 4 No. 9 Retrieved from 
http://web.b.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.utlib.ut.ee/ehost/detail/detail?vid=15&sid=fab2272
d-2154-44c4-bbd3-b42a770eee2c%40pdc-v-
sessmgr01&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#AN=116381446&db=bth 
on March 29, 2018  
 
Wendling, C. (2010) The Comprehensive Approach To Civil-Military Crisis 
Management: A Critical Analysis and Perspective IRSEM Reports Retrieved from 
https://www.eisf.eu/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/0155-Wendling-2010-Comprehensive-
approach.pdf on March 29th, 2018 
 
Wolff, S. (2015) Migration and Refugee Governance in the Mediterranean: Europe and 
International Organizations at Crossroads IAI Working Papers 15/42 28th of October 
Retrieved from 
https://qmro.qmul.ac.uk/xmlui/bitstream/handle/123456789/9485/Wolff%20Migration
%20and%20Refugee%20Governance%202015%20Published.pdf?sequence=1 on 
February 11th, 2018 
 
Yakhlef, S., Basic, G., Akerström, M (2017) Policing Migration: Described and Observed 
Cooperation Experiences of Police and Border Guards in the Baltic Sea Area Journal of 
Applied Security Research Vol. 12, Issue 1 Retrieved from http://www-tandfonline-
com.ezproxy.utlib.ut.ee/doi/full/10.1080/19361610.2017.1228422 on February 11th, 
2018 
 
Yin, Robert.K. (2014) Case study research, design and methods. 5th edition Sage: Los 
Angeles
67 
 
Annex 1 
 
Documents used 
 
Annual and quarterly risk analyses by Frontex from 2015 until 2018. Retrieved from 
https://frontex.europa.eu/publications/?category=riskanalysis from March 18th until April 
5th, 2018.  
 
Press releases by Frontex from 2015 until 2018. Retrieved from 
https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/ from March 18th until April 5th, 
2018.  
 
Press releases by Europol from 2015 until 2018. Retrieved from 
https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom from March 18th until April 5th, 2018.  
 
Annual reviews by Europol from 2015 until 2018. Retrieved from 
https://www.europol.europa.eu/europol_review from March 18th until April 5th, 2018.  
News articles from BBC from 2015 until 2018. Retrieved from www.bbc.com from 
March 18th until April 5th, 2018. 
 
News articles from CNN from 2015 until 2018. Retrieved from www.cnn.com from 
March 18th until April 5th, 2018. 
 
News articles from Reuters from 2015 until 2018. Retrieved from www.reuters.com from 
March 18th until April 5th, 2018. 
 
News articles from Politico from 2015 until 2018. Retrieved from 
https://www.politico.com from March 18th until April 5th, 2018.  
 
News articles from The Guardian from 2015 until 2018. Retrieved from 
https://www.theguardian.com/international from March 18th until April 5th, 2018.
68 
 
I, Urmas Krull (personal code 38007310286), 
herewith grant the University of Tartu a free permit (non-exclusive licence) to: 
Interagency approach in EU’s crisis management during migration crisis of 2015: 
an effective solution or unused opportunity?  supervised by Eoin Micheal McNamara  
 
1. To reproduce, for the purpose of preservation and making available to the public, 
including for addition to the DSpace digital archives until expiry of the term of 
validity of the copyright. 
2. To make available to the public via the web environment of the University of 
Tartu, including via the DSpace digital archives until expiry of the term of validity 
of the copyright. 
3. I am aware that the rights stated in point 1 also remain with the author. 
4. I confirm that granting the non-exclusive licence does not infringe the intellectual 
property rights or rights arising from the Personal Data Protection Act. 
 
Tartu, 21st of May 2018  
 
Urmas Krull 
